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ABSTRACT
The first essay shows that political capital is an important determinant of corporate investment and
innovation. Using the unexpected exits of legislators from the U.S. Congress as exogenous shocks
to politically connected firms’ political capital, I find that losing a political connection induces a
firm to increase its capital expenditure, R&D investment, and patent production. Surprise losses of
political capital result in significant negative announcement returns, as well as significant declines in
sales to the government. On the other hand, the competitors of a firm that loses its political capital
experience significant increases in total sales and sales to the government. Overall, the findings
suggest that political capital serves as a substitute for physical capital. This substitution can arise
from an industry equilibrium in which political capital can be used to maintain a competitive
advantage.
The second essay studies the causal impact of public sector’s spending on private sector’s invest-
ment. Based on the fact that federal funds allocated to states and counties are largely dependent
on the local population level, we use population count revisions in decennial census years as ex-
ogenous shocks to the cross-sectional allocation of federal funds. We document strong evidence
that exogenous increases in the federal spending reduce both firms’ capital and R&D investment.
This contraction in investment is accompanied by a decrease in employment growth as well as a
decrease in sales growth. The effect of government spending is more pronounced among firms that
are smaller-sized, more geographically concentrated, and located in regions with higher employment
rate. Furthermore, we find direct evidence that an exogenous increase in government hiring and
wage spending reduces subsequent corporate employment growth. Taken all together, the evidence
we present is consistent with the crowding out effect of government spending, not through the
traditional interest rate or tax rate channel, but through the labor channel.
The third essay finds that the incentive structure of the acquirer’s management is an important
source of agency costs in M&A activities. When an acquirer’s executive worked at the target firm
ii
in the past, M&A announcement returns of both the acquirer and the target are significantly lower
than M&A announcement returns without such ties. The negative effect on M&A announcement
returns is stronger when the tie between the acquirer’s executive and the target firm is stronger,
as measured by the executive’s ownership of the target firm when the connected executive left the
target firm. This paper provides evidence that the private benefit and preferences of the acquirer’s
management affect corporate takeover decisions, which results in merger decisions that are unlikely
to be in the minority shareholders’ best interest.
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CHAPTER 1
DOES A FIRM’S POLITICAL CAPITAL AFFECT ITS
INVESTMENT AND INNOVATION?
1.1 Introduction
Corporate investment in political capital is sizable. In 2013, the aggregate amount of reported
spending on federal lobbying was $3.24 billion, the majority of which was due to corporate expen-
ditures. Corporate investment in physical capital and R&D spending for technological innovation
are central to a firm’s competitive advantage, as well as aggregate economic growth. Given that
corporations have keen interests in investing in political capital, it is important to understand the
effect of a firm’s investment in political capital on its investment in physical capital, R&D, and
patent production. Nevertheless, the literature provides no satisfactory insight on this important
relationship.
The main empirical challenge in determining the causal relationship between a firm’s political
capital and its physical capital is the endogenous nature of the political capital accumulation
process: a political connection between a firm and a politician is the result of a selection process.
This paper uses a novel empirical approach to resolve this endogeneity problem by utilizing the
unexpected exits of a legislator from the U.S. Congress (exit events) as a source of exogenous
variation in the connected firm’s political capital. The exit of a legislator from the U.S. Congress
is considered to be a surprise if it falls into one of three categories: (1) sudden death of the
individual; (2) resignation from office due to health reasons or disclosures of a personal scandal; or
(3) an incumbent’s surprise electoral loss in a tight race where the final outcome was decided by a
margin of less than 3% or by a court ruling.1
I study a firm’s political connections by examining its lobbying activities. A firm is defined to
be connected to a politician if it hires a lobbyist who worked for that politician’s Congressional
office in the past. In other words, I focus on the strong ties that were developed from a previous
1The results are robust when I do not include exit events triggered by close electoral losses. Those results are
shown in Table 1.4 and Table 1.20.
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employer-employee relationship between a lobbyist and a politician. By looking at the lobbyists
that are hired by the firm, I can then establish the firm’s connections to that politician.
Within the universe of politically connected firms, I compare firms that unexpectedly lose their
political connection (treatment group) to those that do not (control group). Treatment is defined
as the unexpected exit from office of a politician who is a former employer of the firm’s lobbyist.
The identification assumption for the analysis is that the factor leading to the loss of the political
connection (e.g., death, illness, scandal or electoral loss) is not correlated with factors that affect
a firm’s investment and innovation activities except through the political connection with the
departed politician. I quantify the effects of political capital on investment in physical capital and
innovation by comparing firms that have similar financial characteristics, as well as similar political
capital.
I find that losing a political connection is associated with a significantly negative stock-price
reaction: -1.5% for a 3-day window surrounding the exit event. The significance of the abnormal
announcement returns suggests that the market participants do not anticipate exit events and that
exit events have a substantial effect on firms in the treatment group. In addition, I find that the
firms in the treatment group decrease their lobbying spending during the two years after the exit
event, confirming that the exit event is a supply shock to a firm’s political capital and that the
effect is persistent.
I find that a firm significantly increases its capital expenditure and R&D investment the year
after the loss of its political connections. The increased investment in physical capital and R&D
results in more patents and citations. The magnitude of these firm responses are economically
meaningful: the capital expenditure increases by 11%-13%, R&D investment increases by 9%-12%,
and patent applications increases by 6.5% for an average firm in the treatment group. Taken
together, the results show that the political capital of a firm is an important determinant of its
capital expenditures, R&D investment, and innovation activities. The findings support the theory
that investment in political capital substitutes for investment in physical capital.
I explore a channel through which a firm’s political capital affects its investment and innovation.
Using a simple two-period incumbent-entrant model with positive entry cost, I show that the use of
political capital by the incumbent firm as a barrier to market entry implies a clear substitution effect
between a firm’s investment in political capital and investment in physical capital.2 Barrier to entry
can take the form of preferential access to government procurement contracts, thereby reducing the
2Please refer to Section 1.8 for the presentation of the model and the derivation of the predictions.
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connected firm’s product market competition, as well as its need for further investment in physical
capital and R&D. I find that proportion of the sales to the federal government decreases for the
firms in the treatment group.
Another direct prediction from the model is that the competitors of the firms in the treatment
group will gain some competitive advantage that helps them increase their market share when the
firms in the treatment group unexpectedly lose their political capital. Although the incumbent
firm may increase its physical production capacity and R&D to sustain its competitive edge in the
product market in response to its diminished ability to maintain a barrier to entry, those efforts
may not be enough to immediately and fully compensate for the direct benefits attached to the
political capital they previously had. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the competitors
of the firms in the treatment group indeed experience significant increases in their total sales, as
well as the share of sales to the federal government.
To summarize, this paper is the first to show that political capital is an important determinant of
corporate investment and innovation, such as capital expenditures, R&D, and patent applications.
Specifically, the results support the theory that a firm’s political connection is a substitute for its
physical capital. When a firm loses a political connection, its power to raise a rival’s costs and
deter market entry deteriorates. In response, firms that lose their political capital need to invest
more in physical capital and innovation to stay competitive. These actions produce more patents
and citations.
This paper contributes to the literature on the interaction between politics and corporate finance.
Researchers generally confirm the idea that political connections can bestow connected firms with
major economic benefits. For example, Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politically connected
firms receive preferential bank loan financing. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that po-
litically connected firms obtain preferential corporate bailouts during economic downturns. Duchin
and Sosyura (2012) report that the U.S. government provided more Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) funds to politically connected financial institutions than non-connected ones during the
recent financial crisis. Adelino and Dinc (2013) find that the lobbying activities of non-financial
firms increased the likelihood of receiving stimulus funds. In addition, more government procure-
ment contracts were awarded to firms that hired board members with stronger political connections
(Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009). Julio and Yook (2012) show that corporate capital investment
dampens during election years due to the pending policy uncertainty. Similarly, Bhattacharya et
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al. (2014) find that the policy uncertainty during election periods decreases innovation, whereas
policy positions (left, right, or center) per se do not affect innovation.
Consistent with the perceived economic benefits of having strong political connections, the an-
nouncement returns on the news of securing a political connection are positive (Fisman, 2001;
Faccio, 2009; Akey, 2014).3 Fisman (2001) finds that Indonesian firms with tighter connections
to Suharto, the President of Indonesia, experienced a more negative return reaction relative to
less-dependent firms, over the course of the news announcements that Suharto’s health was dete-
riorating.
This paper also contributes to the innovation and economic growth literature. Researchers who
use endogenous growth models emphasizes the importance of the innovation channel in economic
growth (Solow, 1957). Researchers suggest that the long-run growth rate of per capita income
should rise with the increase in R&D intensity or time spent accumulating skills. As long as the
government has enough resources and the allocation of the government resources matters for private
parties, there is enough reason for private parties to engage in rent-seeking, such as lobbying. The
marginal cost of rent-seeking activities can be smaller for larger corporations than a small new
entrant. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) show that rent-seeking activities often have an
increasing return to scale property. An increase in rent-seeking lowers the cost of additional rent-
seeking relative to that of productive investment, until the gain from rent-seeking is all exploited at
the aggregate level. The empirical finding in this paper also supports the notion that the economic
benefits firms with political connections acquire are not mere transfers from non-connected firms
to connected firms, but bears the cost of crowding out economy-wide investment in physical capital
and innovation.
Lastly, this paper is also the first to examine corporate lobbying activities in order to measure a
firm’s political capital. Prior literature generally uses geographic proximity and campaign contri-
bution to proxy for political connection. However, given the large amount of resources that firms
allocate to lobbyists (in 2010, the S&P 500 spent $979.3 million on federal lobbying, compared to
only $120.7 million on campaign contributions), it is natural to establish a firm’s political capital
by studying its lobbying activities.
3Firms that made campaign contributions to candidates who wins in a close election earn higher abnormal returns
compared to firms connected to candidates who lose in a close election (Akey, 2014). Faccio (2006), using cross-
country data, finds that there is a significant increase in corporate value when those involved in business enter politics.
Faccio and Parsley (2009), using international data, shows that the value of (publically-traded) firms located in the
hometown of a politician decreases when the politician suddenly dies.
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Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta (2012) find that lobbying creates shareholder value. Similarly,
Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2014) find that a firm’s corporate lobbying expenditures are positively
correlated to the firm’s stock market performance and cashflow. Even though researchers have
examined the effects of corporate lobbying activities on firm value, there is no research that has
examined the causal effects of a firm’s political connections on its investment and innovation deci-
sions. This paper contributes to the literature on how corporate the lobbying channel affects firm
behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I develop the main hypotheses
that are tested in this paper. In Section 2, I describe the data and construction of main variables.
The empirical strategy is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 explores the real effects of losing a
political connection. Section 5 provides further tests using a matching estimator of the average
effect of the treatment on the treated. In Section 6, I tests for the channel and the mechanism of
the findings. Section 7 discusses welfare implications. The last section concludes.
1.2 Hypothesis Development
A priori, it is unclear whether investment in political capital is a substitute or a complement for
physical capital investment and innovation. On the one hand, the complementary effect hypothesis
posits that an exogenous loss of a firm’s political capital causes a firm to decrease its investment
in physical capital (CapEx) and innovations (R&D). Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) argue
that a firm that has “established lobbies or part of government elites” can invest more since it is
easier for it to acquire government produced assets, such as licenses and construction approvals.
On the other hand, the substitution effect hypothesis posits that an exogenous loss of a firm’s
political capital forces a firm to increase its investment in both physical capital (CapEx) and
innovations (R&D). I use a simple I/O model with two firms, an incumbent and an entrant,
with positive entry cost to formalize the substitution effect.4 A politically connected incumbent
maintains barrier to entry by using two strategic actions: it can either use its political capital to
influence legislators to raise the cost of entry, or it can increase its physical capital and technology
to maintain sufficiently low residual demands for the goods produced by an entrant. As these two
tools to maintain the competitive advantage of politically connected firms are strategic substitutes,
the exogenous loss of one type of capital will result in an increase of the other.
4I formalize the model framework and derive the prediction in Section 1.8.
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This prediction is consistent with the analysis in Romer (1994). Romer (1994) shows that efforts
to raise the cost to potential entrants can result in reduced competition and dramatically decrease
the set of new goods and technologies introduced into the economy. Politically connected firms can
use their connections to reduce the competition. When a firm is politically connected, it may rely
more on political capital to stay competitive, rather than its own product quality or technological
advances.
I explore three testable implications based on the main hypothesis regarding the effects of a firm’s
political capital on its physical capital. First, the increased investment in R&D after the exit event
would imply an increase in the number of patents issued to the firm. Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013)
argue and show that R&D measures “resource input to innovation” and patents are measures of
“innovative output.” If the firms in the treatment group increased their R&D to improve their
competitive advantage, the first testable implication is that the increase R&D investment would
result in an increase in innovation output such as the number of patents and the quality of such
patents.
One particular type of economic benefit that stem from having a political connection can be
that politically connected firms have better access to government procurement opportunities. This
implies a second testable implication where an exit event may cause a firm in the treatment group
to lose some of its sales to the government.
The third testable implication of the model is that direct competitors may be able to improve
their product market position when the firms in the treatment group lose their political capital.
In the simple model, production capacity and technology serve as strategically credible threats
to future market entry. As building production capacity and technological advances take time,
it is highly likely that competitors may gain some competitive advantage in the product market
immediately after an exit event. In other words, a firm in the treatment group may not be able
to fully adjust their capital expenditures and R&D to get their production capacity to a level that
can fully offset the loss of direct benefits bestowed by the political capital it recently lost. This
logic implies that, after the exit event, the firm’s competitors will increase their market share, and,




To establish firms’ political capital, I analyze the lobbying activities of firms and lobbyists’ past
employment history in the public sector to construct the link between a firm and a politician.
First, I establish links between firms and hired lobbyists by using lobbying disclosure reports.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on
December 19, 1995. It requires lobbyists to report all their lobbying activities. Under LDA, all
individual lobbyists must disclose their lobbying expenses; all organizations with in-house lobbyists
must disclose their compensation. Data on lobbying disclosures are available from 1998. The
frequency of reporting was semi-annual until 2007, and have been on a quarterly basis since 2007.
The lobbying disclosure form must include the full list of lobbyists working on behalf of each
client firm, broad policy issues and bills covered by the lobbying service, the compensation amount
for lobbying activities, which chamber of Congress or federal agency was contacted, and which
members of Congress were contacted. Lobbying expense disclosures must be filed with the Clerk
of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate. The reports are available from
the Lobbying Disclosure Electronic Filing System.
For the a client firm (or organization), the reporting threshold for all lobbying-related expenses
is $12,500 a quarter. The lobbying firms are required to report all lobbying-related income from
their clients in each quarter. A lobbying firm does not have to file for clients that do not spend at
least $3,000 a quarter.
Second, I establish the link between a lobbyist and a member of Congress by using the lobbyist’s
prior public-sector employment history. More specifically, a lobbyist is defined to be connected to a
politician if the individual worked as a staff member for the politician before she joined the private
sector. Members of Congress must report their staffer information in the official congressional
salary records. The Senate publishes the salaries of its staffers data biannually, while the House
publishes the data every three months. It is therefore possible to build the employment history
of each staff member using the salary data. When a staffer is paid by a member of Congress, the
individual is considered to have worked for that person. The salary data also articulate the period
of service related to a salary payment, and that period is taken as the employment period in the
analysis.
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I combine the two datasets to establish the connection between a firm and a politician. More
specifically, a firm is connected to a politician when the firm hires a lobbyist that used to work
in that politician’s Congressional office in the past. The final dataset for this analysis is at the
firm-lobbyist-politician level.
In order to construct the dataset of the firms that lose their political connections, I first look at
the politicians who leave Congress. I then track back which former staffers of those politicians are
currently working as lobbyists. In turn, from the lobbying activities disclosures of each firm, I then
determine which companies were hiring those lobbyists during the year when the politicians made
surprise departures from Congress.
The daily stock prices and returns are obtained from CRSP. Accounting data for the firms are
from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. I drop financial service firms (SIC codes between
6000 and 7000) and semi-government firms (SIC codes greater than 9000). I drop firm-quarters
with missing or non-positive assets. Data on the amount of firm sales sold to the U.S. federal
government was obtained from the Compustat Customer Segment file. The sample period is from
1998 to 2013.
The data on firm innovation are from Kogan et al. (2012).5 This database contains utility patents
granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1/1/1926 and 11/02/2010,
along with citation data on these patents.6 I consider only patent applications that are ultimately
granted.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics and Variable Construction
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample and two subsamples: lobbying and
non-lobbying. The detailed definition of each variable is also provided in Table 1.1. The Lobbying
Indicator variable takes a value of 1 if the firm has positive lobbying expenditures during the year.
The proportion of companies engaging in lobbying activities is around 15%. This is consistent with
the summary statistics found in the literature. For example, Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2014) find
5I thank the authors, Leonid Kogan, Dimitris Papanikolaou, Amit Seru, and Noah Stoffman, for kindly sharing
the data.
6This patent data covers a longer period compared to the NBER patent data, which covers all utility patents
granted by the USPTO from 1976 to 2006. I use the patent and citation data in Kogan et al. (2012), since it has
longer sample period, and the authors note that the coverage is larger than the NBER data. The dataset covers
around 1.8 million matched patents. This includes 24% more patent records, which are not available in the NBER
patent data (Kogan et al (2012)). Kogan et al. (2012) also covers utility patents, which represent approximately
99% of all patents issued.
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that the ratio started at about 8% in 1998 and increased to about 19% in 2013. My dataset exhibits
a similar growth pattern. I use the lobbying expenditure disclosure data to construct an indicator
variable of whether a firm engages in lobbying activities during a year. “Firms with lobbying
spending” refers to firms that spend money on lobbying. “Firms without lobbying spending” refers
to the firms that do not report any reported lobbying expenditures and “Firms with lobbying
spending” are likely to be larger than firms without lobbying expenditures. Consistent with the
size differences between the two groups, the cash-holding ratio is also higher for the non-lobbying
firms. Lobbying firms also have lower R&D spending on average compared to non-lobbying firms.
The differences between the two groups are consistent with the notion that politically connected
firms are likely to be entrenched. Finally, I define the treatment indicator variable as equal to 1 if a
company loses a political connection due to the surprise exit of the incumbent during the quarter.
To take into account the potential time-invariant heterogeneity, the outcome variables are con-
structed as the difference of four quarters after and four quarters before the surprise exit quarter,
or the Event. For example, if R&D investment is considered as an outcome variable, I compute the
difference between the average R&D investment in the four quarters after the exit event (Event + 1
year), and the average R&D investment in the four quarters before (Event - 1 year) the exit event,
and denote the difference as ∆R&D. The capital investment outcome variable is constructed anal-
ogously: the difference in capital investment between the four quarters after the exit event (Event
+ 1 year), and capital investment between the four quarters before (“Event - 1 year”) the exit
event, denoted as ∆CapEx.
The other primary measures of company’s outcome is its innovation activities, which are mea-
sured using the firm’s patent applications. I construct these quarterly measures in the following
way. Patent applications during a quarter are the number of patents the firm applied for during
the quarter. I only consider the patent applications that are ultimately granted.
It takes times for a firm to accumulate patents and citations after they undertake R&D invest-
ments (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001); He and Tian (2013)). It is unlikely that the patents
generated by the firms in the treatment group after the exit event (four quarters after) is the
product of recent innovation activities caused by the shock to its political capital. Accordingly, I
compare the innovation outcome during the second and third year after the exit event versus one
year before the exit event. I construct the outcome variable as the change in the average patent
application counts during the five-to-eight quarters after the exit event (Event + 2 years) versus
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the average patent application counts during the four quarters before the exit event (Event - 1
year), denoted as ∆Patent. In order take into account this long-term nature of the innovation
process, I also compute the difference between patent application counts in the third year (9-12
quarters) after the exit event (Event + 3 years) and the average patent application counts during
four quarters before the exit event (Event - 1 year).
1.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I describe the experimental design. I exploit the fact that unexpected departures
of connected politicians can create a negative shock to the connected firms’ political capital. The
unexpected exit of the connected politicians provides a way to identify the causal effect of a firm’s
political capital on its physical capital investment and innovation activities.
1.4.1 Quasi-natural Experiement: Unexpected Loss of Political Capital
I measure a firm’s political connections by studying its lobbying activities. A firm is defined
to as connected to a politician if it hires a lobbyist who worked for that particular politician’s
Congressional office before he became a private-sector lobbyist. In other words, I focus on the strong
ties developed from the past employer-employee relationship between a lobbyist and a politician.
Looking at which lobbyists are hired by a firm, I can then establish the firm’s connections to that
politician. Within the universe of connected firms, I then compare firms that lose their connection
(treatment group) to those that do not (control group). Treatment is defined as the unexpected
exit of a politician who is the former employer of the firm’s lobbyist.
A surprise termination of a political connection happens when a firm’s connected politician loses
his Congressional position. A politician’s exit from Congress is considered a surprise if it falls into
one of the three categories: first, sudden death; second, resignation from the office due to health
reasons or scandal; and third, an incumbent’s surprise electoral loss in a tight race where the final
outcome was decided by a margin of less than 3% or by a court ruling.7
7For example, the following news releases are considered exit events: (1) Rep. Paul Gillmor died from an accidential
fall down the steps in his townhouse. Police assessed the scene, and the death was ruled an accident. (2) Senator
Larry Craig pledge guilty to a misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct and resigned from the U.S. Senate due to
the scandal; (3) As the court ruled in the challenger’s favor and declared him the winner of the election, Senator
Norm Coleman conceded and lost his seat in the U.S. Senate. Senator Coleman initially led Franken on the election
night by a margin of 206 votes out of more than 2.9 million cast. The margin was narrow enough to trigger a recount.
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During the sample period from 1998 to 2013, I have 229 firm-quarters in the treatment group:
105 firm-quarter observations are in the treatment group due to sudden death incidences, 65 firm-
quarter observations due to sudden resignations for health issues or scandal, and 59 firm-quarter
observations due to unexpected electoral losses.8
1.4.2 The Impact of Loss of Political Capital on Firm Value
I follow standard event study methodology and use the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs). I compute the CAR at the news announcement of the exit event. The results are
based on the (-1,+2), (-1,+5), and (-1,+10) event windows, where time 0 is the date of the news
announcement of the exit event. I include one-day prior to the exit event to follow the standard
procedure in the event study literature. This covers a situation where someone unexpectedly
becomes ill one day and dies the next.
Table 1.2 shows that when the news that a politician will step down from office is announced,
firms that have a political connection d with the politician experience a significantly negative stock
price reaction. The price drop is -1.5% for the (-1,+2) event window, -1.7% for the (-1,+5) window.
It might be possible that this negative stock price reaction is due to an industry-wide shock,
which can be attributable to other factors such as a news announcement of an industry-wide pro-
ductivity shock. In particular, if a Senator was representing a common interest of a certain industry,
companies in the industry will be similarly affected by the unexpected loss of their advocate in the
Congress, regardless of the presence of the lobbying connection.
To address this concern, I perform the same event study discussed above using industry-adjusted
CARs. I use industry-adjusted CARs in order to eliminate the market responses corresponding to
the industry-wide shock. Even after controlling for the potential industry-wide policy preferences of
a politician, I find that firms that were connected to the individual still experience a significant loss
in firm value after an exit event. The results show that the industry-adjusted CAR is about -1.1%
for the (-1,+2) event window and -1.4% for the (-1,+5) event window. The result indicates that
a firm connected with a politician via hired lobbyists are able to reap distinct economic benefits
compared to the other firms in the same industry.
Similarly, another concern is that firms in the same state generally have close ties to a Senator
representing the state, and the lobbying connection does not have much effect after taking into
8The results are robust to the exclusion of surprise exits due to surprise losses in close elections.
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account the geographic ties. If this is true, I would find a similar price reaction between the firms
that are connected with the politician via the lobbyist and the firms located in the state that a
Senator is representing. To examine this possibility, I examine the firms’ state-adjusted CARs
during the event window.9 I compute state-adjusted CARs by subtracting the raw returns of
companies minus the average return of companies located in each state, and summing the daily
state-adjusted CARs over the event windows. The results show that the state-adjusted CAR is
-1.4% for the (-1,+2) and (-1,+5) event windows. The results indicate that a geographic tie itself
is not a significant determinant for the economic benefits that the connected firms received.
I also explore differential market reactions across different types of political connections. I exam-
ine whether the firm value loss caused by an exit event is concentrated in either a loss of connection
with a Senator or a loss of connection with a member of the House of Representatives. Table 1.3
shows that both types of connection losses create significantly negative stock price reactions. The
announcement return is marginally larger for losing a connection with a Senator, but it is not
statistically different from losing a connection with a Representative.
As a robustness check, I also examine the stock price reaction for exit event excluding the close
election losses. As the results in Table 1.4 show, I find that the market-adjusted CAR is -1.2% for
the (-1,+2) event window and -1.4% for the (-1,+5) window. This findings confirm that the results
are very similar when I exclude close election losses.
1.4.3 Does Loss of Political Capital Matter?
In this subsection, I investigate the validity of the exit event instrument. An exit event will create
sufficient variation in a firm’s political capital if the loss of political capital cannot be immediately
replaced by a new political connection. In other words, the exit event serves as a shock to the supply
curve of a firm’s political capital because the supply curve of a political capital of an individual
firm is highly inelastic in the short-run.
Table 1.5 shows the effects of the connection loss on the firms in the treatment group’s lobbying
expenditures. After firms lose political connections, they significantly decrease their spending on
lobbying in the next 1-4 quarters (Event + 1 year). Firms in the treatment group also decreases
their lobbying expenditures during the 5-8 quarters after the exit event (Event + 2 years). The
9When Compustat does not list a company’s domicile state information (such as multinationals headquartered
in foreign countries and listed on the U.S. stock exchange), I use market-adjusted CARs of those firms in the state-
adjusted CARs analysis.
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magnitude implied by the regression estimation indicates that on average, a firm with a positive
amount of lobbying spending would decrease their lobbying spending by about 15% in the first
year after an exit event, and further decrease lobbying spending by 10% in the second year after
the exit event.
The results indicate that when a firm loses a political connection, it is hard for the firm to find an
equivalent replacement. The finding is also consistent with the evidence in the literature that the
central role of lobbyists is maintaining contacts with the politicians. This result confirms that the
exit event of a connected politician creates a significant negative shock to a firm’s political capital.
There are many reasons why it is hard for a firm to immediately establish a new political
connection that is as valuable as the previous one. Each politician has his own networks, political
influence, and policy expertise. When an individual exits Congress, the replacement will have a
different set of skills and networks. The new legislator, who is likely to be a freshman Congressman,
will take time to learn and adjust to the culture inside Congress. Moreover, as it is vital for the
new legislator to have policy preferences that are well aligned with the economic interests of the
connected firm, there can be a significant matching problem between the firm and the legislator.
It might also be the case that the firm and the politician communicate soft information, and this
line of communication takes time to develop. Also, even though there may be an another legislator
who is a good match with the firm, the individual might already be politically connected to the
firm’s competitor. In addition, public sector employees are legally required to take a one-to-two
year cooling off period before they can work as private sector lobbyists.10 As a result, although it
is possible that the connection with the new legislator can be as valuable as the previous one, it
will take a long time for the firm to establish a similar relationship with the new person. For all
these reasons, the supply curve of the political capital of a firm is likely be highly inelastic, at least
in the short-run.
1.4.4 Regression Specification
The unexpected exit of a connected politician creates a negative shock to a firm’s political capi-
tal. If political capital is an important determinant for corporate physical capital investment and
innovation, CapEx and R&D, such shock in the stock of political capital should result in a sig-
10U.S. Senators need to take a two-year break before they can work as lobbyists. Senatorial senior staff (who earns
as much as 75% of what Senators earn), members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and their senior staff need
to take a one-year break before they can work as lobbyists. The post-employment restriction is imposed by U.S.
Post-Employment Rules and Restrictions for Former Federal Government Officials.
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nificant change in corporate investment policies. Specifically, two types of capital are substitutes
if an exogenous loss of one leads to an increase in the other. Conversely, two types of capital are
complements if an exogenous loss of one leads to a decrease in the other.
To estimate the effect of the unexpected loss of a political connection on a firm’s investment
policies, I adopt the following regression:
Yi,(t+1,t+4) −Yi,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4
+Firm Controlsi,t−1 + Indk × νt + i,k,t
Yi,(t+1,t+4) −Yi,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4
+Firm Controlsi,t−1 + Indk × νt + i,k,t
(1.1)
where i indexes each company, j indexes industries, t indexes year-quarters, y indexes years, Firm
Controls include Tobin’s Q, Size, Cashflow, and Cash-holding. Lose Connection takes a value
of one when a firm loses a political connection during the quarter. The dependent variables of
interest are R&D investment, capital investment, total investment in physical capital (the sum
of R&D investment and capital investment), and patent applications. All outcome variables are
constructed in difference forms to control for any time-invariant heterogeneity across sample firms.
As I allow serial dependence in the error terms, I cluster the standard errors at the company level.
The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the causal effect of losing a political connection on
firm outcome variables.
A key assumption of the identification strategy is that the loss of a political connection must
not be related to the difference in the changes in the investment in physical capital and innovation
across treatment and control groups. To further validate the exclusion restriction, I also conduct a
pre-trend analysis designed to detect the existence of differential trends across the treatment and
the control groups.
The firms in the treatment group, by definition, are politically connected and engaged in lobbying
activities. One concern is whether it is appropriate to compare the firms in the treatment group
with the whole sample. I address this concern in the following ways. First, the outcome variables
are constructed in difference forms to control for any time-invariant heterogeneity between the firm
that loses a political connection and the firm that does not. As the timing of an event varies
(earlier-end of the event quarter, or later-end of the event quarter), I do not include event-quarter
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variables when measuring the changes in a firm’s investment decisions.
Furthermore, I use two distinct proxies to control for the firm’s stock of political capital: the
amount of lobbying spending, Lobby Spending, and the number of lobbyists hired by each firm, #
of Lobbyists. I use the data from mandatory lobbying report filings to construct these proxies for
measuring firms’ lobbying activities and their stock of political capital. As the lobbying data are
at annual frequencies, I use the four-quarter lagged value of the two proxies as a control variable in
the regression to ensure that I use pre-treatment lobbying activities of the firms in the treatment
group as control variables. Similarly, other firm-level controls, Tobin’s Q, Size, Cashflow, and Cash-
holding, are measured in the quarter before the events. I do not include post-treatment variables
in the model so that the identification is not compromised.
Another concern is whether an unexpected exit of a politician might generate a regional economic
shock. For example, the death of a powerful politician causes a drop in earmark spending allocation
to the deceased politician’s home state (Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2012)), which may affect all
firms located in the state regardless of their lobbying connections. Or, an exit event may change
industry dynamics. These concerns are addressed by including state×year-quarter fixed effects
and industry fixed effects (SIC two-digit level). Similarly, in order to control for the possibility
of time-varying industry-wide conditions, I also estimate specifications that include a full set of
industry (SIC two-digit level)×year-quarter fixed effects.
1.4.5 Parallel Trend Assumption
The core assumption to identify the treatment effect is the so-called parallel trend assumption. In
this assumption, the observed average change in outcome for the treatment group in the absence of
the treatment equals the observed average change in outcome for the control group. In this paper,
it is important in a treatment effect framework to check whether the treatment and control groups
share the same trend in the outcome variables before the treatment. Figure 1 shows the pre-shock
and post-shock trend of the outcome variable, R&D investment. The setting satisfies the parallel
trend assumption. Thus, I can safely draw inference that the difference in the outcome variable in
the post-treatment period results from the legislator exit event triggering the unexpected loss of
political capital.
I also perform regressions to verify the parallel trend assumptions. Tables 1.11 and 1.12 report
the results of the parallel trend analysis. Specifically, I bring the event quarters forward one year,
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and repeat the same set of estimations. That is, I make the pseudo event quarter as five quarters
before the true event to avoid overlapping the true event quarter. This analysis essentially tests
the validity of my empirical strategy. The treated firms do not show any systematic difference in
the quarters before the event. The coefficient on the indicator variable Lose Connection is small
and insignificant in the year preceding the exit event (Event - 1 year). The results show that there
is no pre-existing trend in the data, which confirms the validity of the empirical methodology.
1.5 Real Effects of Exit Events
1.5.1 Whole Sample Results
This section reports the estimation results for the hypothesis that the political capital of a firm
is a strategic substitute for corporate investment in physical capital. As was discussed in 1.4.4, I
estimate the main estimation model 3.1 to identify the the effect of the loss of a political connection
on firm investment decisions.
The results presented in Table 1.6 show that political capital is indeed an important determinant
for corporate investment decisions. The results show that when firms involuntarily lose a politi-
cal connection, they significantly increase investment in physical capital, indicating that political
capital is substitutable for physical capital.
Column (1) of Table 1.6 shows the results for the changes in the R&D investment. The regression
coefficient of changes in R&D investment, ∆R&D, on the indicator variable Lose Connection is
around 0.17 percentage points. Given that the sample mean of the R&D investment is around
0.019, an increase of 0.17 percentage points implies that the R&D investment increases by 9% for
an average firm in the sample. Similarly, column (2) shows the estimation results for the changes
in the capital investment, ∆CapEx. The capital investment of the firm in the treatment group
increases by 0.17 percentage point on average. As an average firm in the sample is spending
about 0.015 on capital expenditures, the regression coefficient implies that the exit event causes a
firm, on average, to increase capital investment by 11%. Furthermore, the results are robust across
different estimation specifications controlling for potential state-wide or industry-wide time-varying
characteristics.
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1.5.2 Comparing Firms with Similar Political Connections
Construction of Control Groups
In order to better compare the firms in the treatment group with similar counterfactuals, I also use
two strategies to construct the control group. The first is to compare the firms in the treatment
group to firms that share the same lobbying firm with the firms in the treatment group. The
lobbying firms are likely to be specialized in certain policy issues or have certain political leanings
that stem from their connections with government agencies or legislators. This implies that the
clientele of the same lobbying firm would likely share certain characteristics regarding their prefer-
ence about policy issues or types of economic benefits, which are hard for a firm’s accounting data
to capture. The second strategy for constructing a control group is to use the fact that there are
two Senators representing each state. When a Senator unexpectedly exits the Senate, I consider
the other Senator representing the same state as a control politician. Firms that hire the control
Senator are selected as controls for firms in the treatment group.
When I estimate the model using the control group, I use the firm-quarter observations from
three years before the treatment (exit event) to three years after the treatment (six-year treatment
window). Although the main identification for estimating the coefficient on the Lose Connection
variable is identified by event observation, other observations before and after the treatment are
necessary to estimate all the other coefficients in the model. Having a longer treatment window may
help estimate other coefficients more stably, but observations far before or after the treatment may
not be as relevant a control as closer ones. As a robustness check, I do the same estimation using no
treatment window, meaning all firm-quarter observations in the sample period are included in the
sample, and find that the results are virtually the same as for the six-year treatment window. This
is as expected, as the main identification for the coefficient on the Lose Connection is identified by
event observations.
Results: Investment
Finally, I test whether an unexpected loss of political capital really matters. The effect should
be observable in a small window where all the other control firms are very similar to the firms
in the treatment group. To construct the valid counterfactuals, I consider two types of control
observations. An observation (firm-quarter level) is considered as a control observation when a
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firm is a client of the same lobbying firm that experiences a surprise loss of a connected politician.
That is, the treatment and control firms both hire the same lobbying firm, but they hire two
different lobbyists. The other type of control is based on the institutional detail that two Senators
always represent each state. A group is treated when the connected Senator representing the state
dies. The control group is the firms connected to the other Senator in the state.
Table 1.7 reports the estimation results. Consistent with the earlier analysis using the whole
sample, I find that the loss of a political connection has a significantly positive effect on a firm’s
investment in physical capital. The magnitude obtained by this regression using the control firms
having very similar political connections as those in the treatment group is also very consistent
with the earlier results. Column (1) of Table 1.7 shows the results for the changes in R&D in-
vestment. The regression coefficient of R&D investment (∆R&D) on the indicator variable Lose
Connection is around 0.2 percentage points. Given that the sample mean of the R&D investment
is around 0.016, an increase of 0.2 percentage points implies that the R&D investment increases
by 12.8%. Column (2) shows the estimation results for the outcome variable changes in the capital
investment, ∆CapEx. The capital investment of a firm in the treatment group increases by 0.17
percentage point on average. As an average firm in the sample has a capital expenditure of 0.013,
the regression coefficient implies that the unexpected loss of a political connection causes firms to
increase capital investment by 13.4%. The results shows that the political capital of a firm has a
first-order importance in determining the a firm’s capital expenditure and R&D investment.
Results: Innovation Output
In this section, I investigate the consequences of the increase in corporate investment decisions,
R&D and CapEx, caused by the unexpected loss of political capital. To compare the innovation
activities of the treated and control firms, I examine the number of patent applications produced
by the treated firm after the exit event. To take into account the time lag between the firms’
investment in R&D and patent production, I examine the number of patent applications generated
during the second year after the exit event versus one year before the exit event to gauge the effects
of an increase in R&D investment made by the firms in the treatment group. That is, I compare
the treatment and control groups in terms of the dependent variable, which is constructed as the
change in the average number of patent applications made during the five-to-eight quarters after
the event (Event + 2 years) versus the average number of patent applications made during four
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quarters before the exit event (Event - 1 year), denoted as ∆Patent(y + 2).
The regression specification is defined as follows:
Patenti,(t+5,t+8) − Patenti,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4
+Firm Controlsi,t−1 + νt + i,t
Patenti,(t+5,t+8) − Patenti,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4
+Firm Controlsi,t−1 + νt + i,t
(1.2)
Table 1.8 also shows that the firms that unexpectedly lose a political capital subsequently produce
more patents. The coefficient on the indicator variable Lose Connection is about 0.13 percentage
points. As an average firm in the sample has a Patent of 0.25 percentage points, the coefficient
implies that the increase in the patent applications produced by a firm in the treatment group is
about 5% compared to the control firms. The results imply that the political capital of a firm
it also important to its innovations. Exogenous loss of a political capital increases the number of
patents produced by the treatment group compared to the control group. Similarly, table 1.9 shows
that the firms in the treatment group garner more citations on the patents that they file after the
sudden loss of a political connection compared to the firms in the control group.
1.5.3 Robustness Checks: Excluding the Close Election Losses
In order to check the robustness of the results, I perform the same test excluding the cases of the
exit events where the firms lose political connections due to the close election losses. Table 1.20
shows the estimation results of equation 3.1 excluding the surprise connection losses due to the
electoral losses in close elections. The results are robust. Although the point estimates are slightly
larger, they are not statistically different than the benchmark estimation results. This is consistent
with the notion that sudden deaths of connected politicians were big surprises to the connected
firms. As having close election loss cases in the sample expands the sample size by about 22%, and
the closest election cases satisfy the identification assumption that there is no omitted variable that
is correlated with being connected to the close election cases in the year before the actual election,
and directly affect firm outcome variables, I include the cases in the analysis.
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1.6 Results Using Matching Estimator
I also provide empirical results using an alternative estimation method: the matching estimator of
the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT). Following the same line of strategy used
to construct the valid counterfactuals, I start with the treatment group that was connected to a
Senator before the exit event (surprise exit of the connected Senator). Each treated observation is
matched with two control observations (with replacement) drawn from the firms connected to the
other Senator who represents the same state.
To make sure the firm characteristics are very similar between the two groups, the matching
process selects the controls so that they best match the treatment group observations in multiple
dimensions including number of lobbyists hired by each firm and firm financial characteristics
such as Tobin’s Q, cash flow, size, industry (two-digit SIC), and year-quarter. Specifically, I use
the Mahalanobis distance measure in defining the controls that best match treated observations.
All covariates are measured in the year prior to the exit event. Furthermore, I impose that the
matched firms should match exactly in terms of the industry (two-digit SIC codes), year-quarter,
and the state represented by the connected Senator. This exact matching was imposed for all
treated observations. The matching procedure is then used to estimate the differences in the
changes in physical capital investment and innovation (∆CapEx, ∆R&D, and ∆TotInvest) before
and after the exit event for the treatment and control groups, conditional on matching the firm
characteristics. The matching estimator results complements the regression results in the sense
that, instead of comparing the average difference in firm outcomes, the matching estimator allows
the comparison between the two sets of firms that are quite similar except for the exposure to the
exit event.
Table 1.14 presents the matching results for the outcome variable of the change in R&D invest-
ment, ∆R&D, before and after the shock. The treatment and matched control groups are very
similar in firm characteristics. One dimension where the two groups are marginally different is the
Cashflow; the firms in the treatment generally had a lower Cashflow in the year prior to the exit
event, and increased R&D investment significantly more than the control group.
Table 1.15 reports the matching results for the outcome variable of the change in capital expendi-
tures, ∆CapEx, before and after the exit event. After matching, the treatment and control groups
are very similar. I do not find any significant differences in the pre-treatment characteristics across
the two groups. As the outcome variable is already in the difference form, four-quarters before and
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after the exit event, the matching estimator gives the difference-in-difference of the changes in firm
outcomes before and after the shock. I find that treated firms in the treatment group, following an
exit event, increase capital investment significantly more than the firms in the control group.
Table 1.16 reports the matching results for the outcome variable of the change in total investment
on physical capital and innovation, ∆TotInvest, before and after the exit event. After matching,
the firm characteristics of the treatment and control groups are very similar. I do not find any
significant differences in the pre-treatment characteristics across the two groups. As the outcome
variable is already in the difference form, four quarters before and after the exit event, the matching
estimator gives a difference-in-differences of the changes in firm total investment before and after
the shock. I find that firms in the treatment group, following the loss of a political connection,
increase total investment significantly more than the firms in the control group.
1.7 Channel
I consider a possible channel through which a firm’s political capital affects its decisions concerning
investments in physical capital and R&D.
Political capital can be used to influence legislators to raise the cost of entry. Using a simple two-
period incumbent-entrant model with positive entry cost, I show that the use of political capital
by the incumbent firm as a barrier to entry implies a clear substitution effect between a firm’s
investment in political capital and investment in physical capital.11.
The unexpected loss of political capital may cause a firm in the treatment group to significantly
increase its investment in physical capital and R&D. The purpose of the increased investment in
production capacity and technology is to offset the loss of their dominance in the marketplace,
which was previously maintained by the use of their political capital.
Barrier of entry can take the form of preferential access to government procurement contracts
and effectively reduce its product market competition, thereby reducing the need for further in-
vestment in physical capital and R&D. This preferential sales channel might be one of the reason
why politically connected firms do not need to be as innovative in terms of product quality or
manufacturing technology.
To directly test this channel, I examine how an unexpected loss of a political capital affects the
11See Section 1.8 for the formalization of the model.
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proportion of a firm’s sales to the government. The regression specification is:
Govt Sales/Salesi,(t+1,t+4) −Govt Sales/Salesi,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t
+γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Firm Controlsi,t−1
+Indk × νt + i,k,t
Govt Sales/Salesi,(t+1,t+4) −Govt Sales/Salesi,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t
+γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Firm Controlsi,t−1
+Indk × νt + i,t
(1.3)
Table 1.17 reports the estimation results. I find that the loss of a political connection leads to
a decrease in government sales. More specifically, the dependent variable is the fraction of the
products sold to the federal government out of total annual sales. As an average firm’s government
sales is about 9.37%, the average drop in the proportion of sales to government due to the exit
event is estimated to be about 7%. The result indicates that the loss of a political connection
causes firms to lose their preferential sales to the government, thus the firms need to find other
buyers for their goods.
Another direct implication of the model is that the firms in the treatment group may not be
able to fully compensate for the loss of the associated competitive advantage. In the model,
production capacity and innovations are strategically credible threats to deter future market entry,
but the capacity expansion and technological advances will take time to build. This implies that,
if exit events are unanticipated, the competitors of a firm in the treatment group may be able to
immediately gain some market shares.
To test the predictions, I examine how the exit event of a firm in the treatment group affects its
competitor’s proportion of sales to the government. The regression specification is:
Yci,(t+1,t+4) −Yci,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Competitor}ci,t + γ# of Lobbyistsci,t−4
+Firm Controlsci,t−1 + Indk × νt + ci,t
Yci,(t+1,t+4) −Yci,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Competitor}ci,t + γLobby Spendingci,t−4
+Firm Controlsci,t−1 + Indk × νt + ci,t
where Y is the outcome variable, Govt Sales/Sales and Sales, ci indexes each company, j indexes
industries, t indexes year-quarters, and y indexes years. Firm Controls include Tobin’s Q, Size,
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Cashflow, and Cash holdings. The indicator variable Competitor takes a value of one when the
firm is a competitor of a firm in the treatment group and the firm in the treatment group loses a
political connection during the year-quarter. I use the Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2014) text-based
network industry classification (TNIC) to define the close competitors of firms in the treatment
group. The estimation results are presented in Table 1.18. Consistent with this prediction, I find
that the competitors of the firms in the treatment group indeed experience significant increases in
their total sales, as well as share of sales to the federal government.
1.8 Model Framework
I consider a two-period leader-follower game (Stackelberg, 1934)) with a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
where the two firms’ choice variable is production capacity and technology accumulation, k, which
will determine the output level of each firm. The model has two firms: an incumbent firm F1 and
an entrant firm F2. The two firms are assumed to be identical, except that the potential entrant
firm has to pay an entry cost. In period 1, F1 chooses its production capacity k1 ∈ [0,∞). In
period 2, given the production capacity choice of F1, F2 decides whether to enter by choosing its
production capacity, k2 > 0 or to stay out, k2 = 0.
A key innovation that I introduce to the standard model (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983) is that
now incumbents have two types of tools – political connections and k – to keep entry costs high, thus
keeping potential entracts from entering the market. The entry cost is denoted as E ∈ {EL, EH},
where E > 0 and EH > EL. E serves as a barrier to entry. There are two ways to maintain a high
entry barrier E. One is to establish and maintain a high political capital to influence legislators to
effectively raise entry barriers, while the other is to use capacity accumulation as a credible threat
to entry. When the incumbent firm is politically connected, the entry barrier E rises to EH from
the benchmark case EL where it does not have a political connection. The rationale is that as the
incumbent is protected by having a political connection, the entrant should also invest in political
capital to level the playing field. The need for the investment in political capital increases the cost
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of entry for an entrant. I define the profit for firm F1 and F2 as:
pi1(k1, k2) ≡ k1(1− k1 − k2) (1.4)
pi2(k1, k2) =

k2(1− k1 − k2)− E if entry occurs
0 otherwise
(1.5)
In period 2, firm F2 takes k1 = k
′
1 as given and chooses k2 to maximize its profit. When an
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(1.6)
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The second period best-response function of the firm F2 depends on E and k1. When a firm
loses a political connection, the entry cost drops from EH to EL. Note that since EL < EH :
k
′H




1 ≡ 1− 2
√
EL
The best-response function of the firm, f2, insinuates that E
H implies a lower of threshold to
invest: k
′H
1 ≡ 1− 2
√
EH . In other words, without a political connection, the entry cost is EL and
the corresponding capital necessary to deter entry is higher, k
′L
1 ≡ 1− 2
√
EL.
When an incumbent firm loses a political connection that allowed it to enjoy a high barrier to
entry, the firm strategically increases its production capacity in an attempt to keep its market share.
The irreversibility of capacity accumulation, such as physical capital and R&D investment, makes
the capacity expansion, k, a credible threat. That is, by accumulating capacity, the incumbent
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sends a credible signal that, in the event of entry, it may utilize all its production capacity to
reduce the price of the good to that level that makes market entry unprofitable for a potential
entrant.
The model illustrates the substitution effect between political capital and physical capital as
a way to deter potential market entry. An industry with a politically connected incumbent can
maintain a higher level of entry cost, as the incumbent can influence legislators and government
agencies to raise the entry cost of potential rival firms. Since political connections help incumbents
to maintain high entry costs, the production capacity, k, required to preempt a potential entrant
from entering the market is lower relative to the benchmark case where the incumbent does not
have a political connection. In real world application of the model, firms that lose a political
connection will increase physical capital investment (capital expenditure and R&D investment) in
order to raises their production capacity.
As is articulated in Spence (1977), production capacity accumulation can be used as a strategic
variable to deter entry. The irreversibility makes production capacity accumulation a credible
threat to a potential entrant. As long as entry does not occur, the capacity of the incumbent is
underutilized. However, in the event of a threat of entry, the incumbent can use all the capacity,
thereby reducing the product price to the level that makes entry unprofitable for a potential entrant.
Importantly, production capacity accumulation can take various forms. It can be thought of as
any type of firm effort with some degree of irreversibility that can be utilized to reduce the residual
demand for the goods sold by the entrant. For example, a firm can expand existing product lines,
which may cause the firm to accelerate R&D investment, as well as expand manufacturing facilities.
R&D investment to reduce the cost of the current production (i.e., process innovation) or searching
for technologies for producing new products (i.e., product innovation) can both be considered as
credible threats for new entrants. Firms may initiate a new product, which is close to the center
of the Hotelling demand line, so that the residual demand for the entrant shrinks. The incumbent
can also introduce more products and offer more types of products.
1.9 Welfare Discussion
Overall, the results show that loss of a political capital creates a significant loss in firm value. This
loss in value is reflective of the reduction in economic benefits attributable to having a political
connection, which implies that the connected firms benefited from their lobbying activities.
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However, this economic advantage may not be just a simple value transfer from firms that are not
politically connected to firms that are politically connected. Based on all the evidence presented in
this paper, the value of political capital comes from the ability to impose a high barrier to market
entry. In an economy where (1) established incumbents can invest aggressively in political capital
and reduce their need for further investment in physical capital and innovation, in addition to (2)
innovative new entrants, such as start-ups, may not be able to enter the market due to high barrier
to entry, the overall investment and innovation activities in the whole economy may be suboptimal.
As the economics literature has shown that investment and innovation are the main driving forces
for economic growth, the overall underinvestment implies negative welfare implications for the
whole economy.
This is consistent with the findings in Bloom, Schankerman, and Reenen (2013). They find that
the gross social returns to R&D are at least twice as high as the private returns. Moreover, Romer
(1994) shows that the deadweight loss of having this feature of “protectionism” for the incumbent
producers that are already in the market would generate a significantly large economy-wide welfare
loss. Furthermore, Romer (1994) shows that welfare loss is mainly created by two forces; first,
consumers have to pay a higher price for goods, and second, “protectionism” dramatically reduces
the goods and technology introduced into the economy.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper is the first to show that political capital is an important determinant of corporate
investment and innovation. To overcome the empirical challenge that a political connection is
likely to be the result of a self-selection process, I use the unexpected exits of legislators from the
U.S. Congress as exogenous shocks to politically connected firms’ political capital and measure the
causal effects of political capital on physical capital investment.
I find that political connection losses create a significantly negative stock-price reaction: -1.5%
for the 3-day window surrounding the exit event. The significance of the abnormal announcement
returns implies that the market participants do not anticipate exit events and that exit events have
a substantial effect on the firms in the treatment group. In addition, I find that the firms in the
treatment group decrease their spending on lobbying activities during the two years after the exit
event, confirming that the exit event is a supply shock to a firm’s political capital and that the
effect is persistent.
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I find that a firm significantly increases its capital expenditure and R&D investment the year
after the loss of a political connection. Subsequently, the increased investment in physical capital
results in more patents and patent citations. The magnitude of these responses are economically
meaningful: capital expenditure increases by 11%-13%, R&D increases by 9%-12%, and patent
applications increase by 6.5% for an average firm in the treatment group. Overall, the results
show that the political capital of a firm is an important determinant of its R&D investment,
capital expenditures, and innovation activities. The findings support the theory that investment
in political capital substitutes for investment in physical capital.
I consider a possible channel through which a firm’s political capital affects its investment in
physical capital and innovation. First, a firm’s political capital can provide it with preferential
access to government procurement contracts and effectively reduce its product market competition,
thereby reducing the need for further investment in physical capital and R&D. I find that the
proportion of the sales to the federal government decrease when firms lose their political connections.
Second, political capital can serve as a barrier to entry since a firm can use its political capital
to influence legislators to raise the cost of entry, such as imposing regulations on industry control.
Using a simple model, I show that the use of political capital as a barrier to entry implies a
clear substitution effect between a firm’s investment in political capital and investment in physical
capital. I find that the competitors of firms in the treatment group experience significant increases
in total sales, as well as share of sales to the federal government. This finding is consistent with
the model’s prediction that competitors of firms in the treatment group will gain some competitive
advantage that helps them increase market share when firms in the treatment group suddenly lose
their political capital.
To summarize, I show evidence that political capital of a firm is an important determinant of
corporate investment and innovation such as capital expenditures, R&D, and patent applications.
Specifically, the results support the theory that a firm-level political connection is a substitute for
physical capital. When a firm loses a political connection, its power to raise its rival’s costs and
deter market entry deteriorates. In response, firms that lose its political capital need to invest
more in capital and R&D to stay competitive. Subsequently, their increased investment in physical
capital and R&D produces more patents and patent citations.
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1.11 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Investment Parallel Trends around Exit Events
This figure presents the parallel trends of R&D and total investment, TotInvest (= R&D + CapEx), of treatment
and control groups around an exit event. Firms in the treatment group are firms that are connected to the politician
who made an unexpected departure in the year prior to exit event. Control firms are firms that hired the same
lobbying firm as the firm in the treatment group or had a political connection to the other Senator who also represent
the same state as the Senator who made an unexpected exit. R&D is defined as the ratio of annual research and
development expenditures to assets. Total Investment is defined as the ratio of the sum of the annual research and
development expenditures and capital expenditures to assets.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables of interest, constructed from the firm-quarter observations
from 1998 to 2013. CapEx is capital expenditures (Compustat item capx) divided by total assets. R&D is
amount spent in research and development expenditures (Compustat item xrdq) divided by total assets (Compustat
item atq). Q is market value of asset (mva) scaled by assets, where mva is computed using Compustat items as
prccq×cshoq+atq-ceqq-txditcq. Cashflow is operating income before depreciation (Compustat item oibdp) scaled
by total assets. Cash − holding is cash and cash equivalents (Compustat item che) scaled by total assets. Market
Leverage is long-term and short-term debt (Compustat item dltt+dlc) scaled by market value of assets (mva). Book
Leverage is long-term and short-term debt (Compustat item dltt+dlc) scaled by total assets. Cash payout is cash
dividends (Compustat item dvy) scaled by total assets. When cash dividend is missing, I replace it with zero. I
use the lobbying expenditure disclosure data to construct an indicator variable whether a firm engages in lobbying
activities during the year. The Lobbying Indicator takes a value of one if a firm spend positive amount of lobbying
expenditure. “Firms with lobbying spending” refers to firms that spend a positive amount on lobbying expenditures.
“Firms without lobbying spending” refers to the firms that do not have any reported lobbying expenditures.
Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75
CapEx 0.015 0.024 0.003 0.008 0.017
R&D 0.019 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.018
Q 2.528 3.515 1.075 1.496 2.471
Cashflow -0.019 0.208 -0.009 0.023 0.042
Cash holdings 0.212 0.245 0.027 0.107 0.318
Market Leverage 0.167 0.186 0.004 0.104 0.272
Book Leverage 0.290 0.531 0.012 0.184 0.374
Cash payout 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
Patent counts 2.012 21.047 0.000 0.000 0.000
Citation counts 9.899 120.220 0.000 0.000 0.000
Patent/Assets 0.002 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000
Citation/Assets 0.024 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lobbying Indicator 0.150 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 354096
Firms with lobbying spending Firms without lobbying spending
Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75
Size 7.526 2.034 6.221 7.719 9.081 4.971 2.219 3.386 4.932 6.494
CapEx 0.014 0.017 0.005 0.009 0.017 0.015 0.025 0.003 0.007 0.017
R&D 0.012 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.020 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.020
Q 2.140 2.011 1.133 1.536 2.338 2.601 3.728 1.062 1.487 2.504
Cashflow 0.021 0.065 0.016 0.030 0.045 -0.027 0.224 -0.016 0.021 0.041
Cash holdings 0.168 0.203 0.027 0.085 0.231 0.220 0.251 0.028 0.112 0.336
Market Leverage 0.183 0.166 0.041 0.146 0.285 0.164 0.189 0.002 0.094 0.269
Book Leverage 0.260 0.228 0.090 0.241 0.377 0.295 0.568 0.007 0.170 0.373
Cash payout 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
Patent counts 9.449 50.104 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.781 9.498 0.000 0.000 0.000
Citation counts 46.714 299.658 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.806 41.518 0.000 0.000 0.000
Patents/Assets 0.002 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000
Citations/Assets 0.015 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 53024 301072
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Table 1.2: Announcement Return of Connection Losses
This table shows the abnormal returns due to an announcement of the exit events. The table presents 2-day,
5-day, and 10-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). CAR is the sum of daily abnormal returns (raw return
minus market return) over the event window. Industry-adjusted return is computed as the raw return minus
equal-weighted average return of all firms in the same 49 Fama-French industries. State-adjusted return is
computed as the raw return minus the equal-weighted average return of all firms headquartered in the same
state. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Panel A: Abnormal Returns
CAR(-1, 2) CAR(-1, 5) CAR(-1, 10)
-0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0078)
Observations 229 229 229
Panel B: Industry-Adjusted Abnormal Returns
IndAdjCAR(-1, 2) IndAdjCAR(-1, 5) IndAdjCAR(-1, 10)
-0.0107∗∗ -0.0140∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0076)
Observations 229 229 229
Panel C: State-Adjusted Abnormal Returns
StateAdjCAR(-1, 2) StateAdjCAR(-1, 5) StateAdjCAR(-1, 10)
-0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0140∗∗∗ -0.0180∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0079)
Observations 229 229 229
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Table 1.3: Announcement Return of Connection Losses: House vs. Senate
This table shows the announcement return of the exit event. The Senate column shows the announcement
return of the treatment group connected to a Senator, and the House column shows the announcement
return of the treatment group connected to a member of House of Representatives. The cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal return (raw return minus market return) over the







Table 1.4: Announcement Return of Connection Losses: Excluding Close Elec-
tions and Scandals
This table shows the announcement return of the exit event excluding close elections and scandals. The
table presents 2-day, 5-day, and 10-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). CAR is the sum of the firm’s
daily abnormal return (raw return minus market return) over the event window. *, **, and *** represent
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Panel A: Excluding Elections
CAR(-1, 2) CAR(-1, 5) CAR(-1, 10)
-0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0070)
Observations 170 170 170
Panel B: Excluding Scandals
CAR(-1, 2) CAR(-1, 5) CAR(-1, 10)
-0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.019∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 200 200 200
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Table 1.5: Changes in Lobbying Spending After the Exit Event
This table shows that firms that lose political connections (treatment group) decrease the amount of lobbying ex-
penditures in the following years. Lose Connection takes a value of one when a firm loses a political connection
during the quarter. LobbySpend is log(dollar amount spent on lobbying+1). ∆LobbySpend(y+1) is the average of
lobby spending in the four quarters following the exit event minus the average of lobby spending during the four
quarters before the event. ∆LobbySpend(y+2) is the average of lobby spending in the five-to-eight quarters following
the event of political connection loss minus the average of lobby spending during the four quarters after the event.
Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level.
The standard errors are clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical
significance, respectively.
Yi,(t+1,t+4) −Yi,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + Firm Controlsi,t−1 + Ind× νt + i,t
Yi,(t+5,t+8) −Yi,(t+1,t+4) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + Firm Controlsi,t−1 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3)
∆Lobby Spending(y+1) ∆Lobby Spending(y+2) ∆Lobby Spending(y+3)
Lose Connection -1.0253∗∗∗ -0.7581∗∗∗ -0.4182∗
(0.3828) (0.2371) (0.2417)
Q 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0033 -0.0008
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Size -0.0058 -0.0386∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0030) (0.0033)
Cashflow 0.2089∗∗∗ 0.0974∗∗∗ 0.1171∗∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0302) (0.0334)
Cash-holdings 0.1155∗∗∗ -0.0404 -0.0462
(0.0394) (0.0282) (0.0321)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 245554 225600 196380
R2 0.055 0.058 0.070
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Table 1.6: Real Effects - Changes in Investments and R&D - Using The Whole
Sample
The table shows that the political capital is substitutable for physical capital. Lose Connection takes a value of one
when a firm loses a political connection during the quarter. The outcome variables are R&D, CapEx, and TotInvest
(= R&D + CapEx). The dependent variable is the average of investment outcomes in the four quarters following
the event of political connection loss minus the average of investment outcomes during the four quarters before the
event. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the number of lobbyists hired
by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of Lobbyist are lagged
by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry is defined at the
two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest ∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest
Lose Connection 0.0016∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Lobby Spending -0.5054∗∗∗ 0.0326 -0.5341∗∗
(0.1414) (0.0854) (0.2157)
# of Lobbyists -0.0051∗ 0.0001 -0.0057
(0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0038)
Q -0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0000 -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Size -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Cashflow 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0013)
Cash holdings 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 239088 227638 227638 239088 227638 227638
R2 0.029 0.057 0.039 0.026 0.042 0.033
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Table 1.7: Real Effects Using Control Groups of Similarly Connected Firms
The table shows that the political capital is substitutable for physical capital, using a refined control group sample.
The control groups are (1) the firms that share the same lobbying firm with the treated firms or (2) the firms that are
connected to a (non-treated) Senator representing the same state as the treated firms. Lose Connection takes a value
of one when a firm loses a political connection during the quarter. The outcome variables are R&D, CapEx, and
TotInvest (= R&D + CapEx). The dependent variable is the average of investment outcomes in the four quarters
following the event of political connection loss minus the average of investment outcomes during the four quarters
before the event. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the number of
lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of
Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry
is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest ∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest
Lose Connection 0.0020∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0013)
Lobby Spending -0.2885 0.1487 -0.2162
(0.2338) (0.2469) (0.4637)
# of Lobbyists 0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0023
(0.0091) (0.0036) (0.0138)
Q -0.0006∗∗ 0.0002∗ -0.0004 -0.0007∗∗ 0.0002∗ -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Cashflow 0.0009 0.0024∗ 0.0091 0.0008 0.0023 0.0084
(0.0042) (0.0013) (0.0077) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0078)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9309 9170 9170 9309 9170 9170
R2 0.082 0.251 0.113 0.079 0.250 0.112
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Table 1.8: Changes in Patent Counts Using Control Groups of Similarly Con-
nected Firms
The table shows that the increased physical capital investment results in more patent, using a refined control group
sample. The control groups are (1) the firms that share the same lobbying firm with the treated firms or (2) the firms
that are connected to a (non-treated) Senator representing the same state as the treated firms. Lose Connection
takes a value of one when a firm loses a political connection during the quarter. The outcome variable is Patents,
defined as number of patents produced scaled by total assets. The dependent variable is the average of Patents in
the five-to-eight quarters following the event of political connection loss minus the average of investment outcomes
during the four quarters before the event. The control groups are (1) the firms that share the same lobbying firm
with the treated firms or (2) the firms that are connected to a (non-treated) Senator representing the same state
as the treated firms. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the number
of lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of
Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+8,t+5) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+8,t+5) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Patent(y+2) ∆Patent(y+2) ∆Patent(y+3) ∆Patent(y+3)
Lose Connection 0.0013∗∗ 0.0011∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0009∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Lobby Spending 0.2030 0.2936
(0.2040) (0.2344)
# of Lobbyists 0.0065 0.0085∗
(0.0044) (0.0046)
Q -0.0002∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Size 0.0002∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0005∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Cashflow 0.0138∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0158∗ 0.0174∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0088) (0.0085)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4570 4570 3445 3445
R2 0.298 0.295 0.303 0.297
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Table 1.9: Changes in Citation Counts Using Control Groups of Similarly Con-
nected Firms
The table shows that the increased physical capital investment leads the firms in the treatment group to garner
more citation counts, using a refined control group sample. The control groups are (1) the firms that share the same
lobbying firm with the treated firms or (2) the firms that are connected to a (non-treated) Senator representing the
same state as the treated firms. Lose Connection takes a value of one when a firm loses a political connection during
the quarter. The outcome variable is Patents, defined as number of patents produced scaled by total assets. The
dependent variable is the average of Patents in the five-to-eight quarters following the event of political connection
loss minus the average of investment outcomes during the four quarters before the event. The control groups are
(1) the firms that share the same lobbying firm with the treated firms or (2) the firms that are connected to a
(non-treated) Senator representing the same state as the treated firms. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual
lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the number of lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual
frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry is defined at the
two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+8,t+5) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+8,t+5) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Citation(y+2) ∆Citation(y+2) ∆Citation(y+3) ∆Citation(y+3)
Lose Connection 0.0064∗ 0.0062∗ 0.0131∗ 0.0137∗
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0079) (0.0075)
Lobby Spending 1.0598 2.2437∗∗
(0.6737) (1.0993)
# of Lobbyists 0.0159 0.0309
(0.0472) (0.1178)
Q -0.0032∗∗ -0.0029∗∗ -0.0054∗∗ -0.0048∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0026)
Size 0.0022 0.0022 0.0037 0.0029
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0030)
Cashflow 0.0460 0.0453 0.1101 0.1010
(0.0554) (0.0547) (0.1276) (0.1226)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4570 4570 3445 3445
R2 0.318 0.315 0.356 0.350
37
Table 1.10: Placebo Test Using the Whole Sample: Changes in Investments and
R&D in the Pre-treatment Period
This table tests the core assumption to identify the treatment effect, the parallel trend assumption, that the firms
that had a shock in their political capital and the firms in the control group share the same trend in the observed
average change in the outcome variables before the treatment. The firm outcome variables are R&D, CapEx, and
TotInvest (= R&D+CapEx). The dependent variable is the average of investment outcomes in the four quarters
following the event of (placebo) political connection loss minus the average of investment outcomes during the four
quarters before the event. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the
number of lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and
# of Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest ∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest
Lose Connection 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Lobby Spending -0.5572∗∗ 0.0236 -0.5277∗
(0.1740) (0.0889) (0.2299)
# of Lobbyists -0.0054 0.0006 -0.0049
(0.0033) (0.0013) (0.0039)
Q -0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0000 -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0000 -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Size -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Cashflow 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0046∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0013)
Cash holdings 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 215864 205726 205726 215864 205726 205726
R2 0.031 0.058 0.040 0.031 0.058 0.040
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Table 1.11: Placebo Test Using Control Group: Changes in Investments and
R&D in the Pre-treatment Period
This table tests the core assumption to identify the treatment effect, the parallel trend assumption, that the firms
that had a shock in their political capital and the firms in the control group share the same trend in the observed
average change in the outcome variables before the treatment. The firm outcome variables are R&D, CapEx, and
TotInvest (= R&D+CapEx). The dependent variable is the average of investment outcomes in the four quarters
following the event of (placebo) political connection loss minus the average of investment outcomes during the four
quarters before the event. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the
number of lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and
# of Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest ∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest
Lose Connection 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010)
# of Lobbyists -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0087
(0.0121) (0.0051) (0.0167)
Lobby Spending -0.4846 0.1885 -0.3272
(0.2795) (0.2733) (0.4998)
Q -0.0007∗ 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006∗ 0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Size 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Cashflow -0.0073 0.0026 -0.0059 -0.0061 0.0030 -0.0039
(0.0066) (0.0020) (0.0074) (0.0057) (0.0019) (0.0063)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7029 6916 6916 7029 6916 6916
R2 0.074 0.217 0.105 0.079 0.219 0.106
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Table 1.12: Placebo Test: Changes in Patent Counts in the Pre-treatment Period
This table tests the core assumption to identify the treatment effect, the parallel trend assumption, that the firms that
had a shock in their political capital and the firms in the control group share the same trend in the observed average
change in the outcome variables before the treatment. The outcome variable is Patents, defined as number of patents
produced scaled by total assets. The dependent variable is the average of investment outcomes in the five-to-eight
quarters following the event of (placebo) political connection loss minus the average of investment outcomes during
the four quarters before the event. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is
the number of lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending
and # of Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
(Changes from year y-2 to y) (Changes from year y-2 to y+1)
∆Patent(y+2) ∆Patent(y+2) ∆Patent(y+3) ∆Patent(y+3)
Lose Connection -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Lobby Spending -0.4821∗∗∗ -0.5585∗∗∗
(0.1181) (0.1146)
# of Lobbyists 0.0063 0.0171
(0.0074) (0.0109)
Q -0.0001 -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Size 0.0003∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0005∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Cashflow 0.0132∗∗ 0.0145∗∗ 0.0183∗ 0.0209∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0102) (0.0101)
Industry×Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3467 3467 2686 2686
R2 0.361 0.337 0.356 0.337
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Table 1.13: Placebo Test: Changes in Citation Counts in the Pre-treatment
Period
This table tests the core assumption to identify the treatment effect, the parallel trend assumption, that the firms that
had a shock in their political capital and the firms in the control group share the same trend in the observed average
change in the outcome variables before the treatment. The outcome variable is Patents, defined as number of patents
produced scaled by total assets. The dependent variable is the average of investment outcomes in the five-to-eight
quarters following the event of (placebo) political connection loss minus the average of investment outcomes during
the four quarters before the event. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is
the number of lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending
and # of Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
(Changes from year y-2 to y) (Changes from year y-2 to y+1)
∆Citation(y+2) ∆Citation(y+2) ∆Citation(y+3) ∆Citation(y+3)
Lose Connection -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0049 -0.0041
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0064) (0.0064)
Lobby Spending 0.6749 1.8837∗
(0.5802) (1.0546)
# of Lobbyists -0.0364 -0.1753
(0.0770) (0.1962)
Q -0.0030∗∗ -0.0029∗∗ -0.0056∗ -0.0054∗
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0028)
Size 0.0026∗ 0.0023 0.0049 0.0038
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Cashflow 0.0518 0.0453 0.1215 0.0945
(0.0637) (0.0607) (0.1389) (0.1279)
Industry×Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3467 3467 2686 2686
R2 0.374 0.374 0.390 0.394
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Table 1.14: Matching Estimator - R&D Investment Around the Surprise Exit of
a Connected Politician
The table shows the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) using propensity score matching. The
matching estimator shows that the treated firms increase R&D investment significantly more than the control. The
firm outcome variable is ∆R&D, which is the average R&D investment in the four quarters following the event of
political connection loss minus the average R&D investment during the four quarters before the event. The treated
and control firms are matched on Q, Cashflow, Size and # of Lobbyists. # of Lobbyists is the total number of
lobbyists hired by each firm. The treated and control firms are exactly matched on (1) the industry (two-digit SIC),
(2) the year-quarter, and (3) the state of the connected Senator. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
of statistical significance, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Treated Control Difference
∆R&D (ATT) 0.0040∗∗ -0.0005 0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Q 2.7819 2.0836 0.6983
(0.4119) (0.1604) (0.4307)
Cashflow -0.0265 0.0267 -0.0532∗
(0.0292) (0.0044) (0.0295)
Size 7.4400 8.1385 -0.6984
(0.4205) (0.2704) (0.4385)




Table 1.15: Matching Estimator - Capital Investment Around the Surprise Exit
of a Connected Politician
The table shows the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) using propensity score matching. The
matching estimator shows that the treated firms increase capital expenditures significantly more than the control.
The firm outcome variable is ∆CapEx, which is the average of capital expenditure in the four quarters following
the event of political connection loss minus the average of capital expenditure during the four quarters before the
event. The treated and control firms are matched on Q, Cashflow, Size and # of Lobbyists. # of Lobbyists is the
total number of lobbyists hired by each firm. The treated and control firms are exactly matched on (1) the industry
(two-digit SIC), (2) the year-quarter, and (3) the state of the connected Senator. *, **, and *** represent the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Treated Control Difference
∆CapEx (ATT) 0.0004 -0.0015 0.0020∗
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Q 2.3810 2.0344 0.3465
(0.2469) (0.1584) (0.2602)
Cashflow 0.0012 0.0250 -0.0238
(0.0163) (0.0045) (0.0168)
Size 7.5739 8.1413 -0.5674
(0.3750) (0.2717) (0.4002)




Table 1.16: Matching Estimator - Total Investment Around the Surprise Exit of
a Connected Politician
The table shows the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) using propensity score matching. The
matching estimator shows that the treated firms increase total investment significantly more than the control firms.
The firm outcome variable is ∆TotInvest (= ∆{R&D+CapEx}), which is constructed as the average total investment
in the four quarters following the event of political connection loss minus the average total investment during the
four quarters before the event. The treated and control firms are matched on Q, Cashflow, Size and # of Lobbyists.
# of Lobbyists is the total number of lobbyists hired by each firm. The treated and control firms are exactly matched
on (1) the industry (two-digit SIC), (2) the year-quarter, and (3) the state of the connected Senator. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Treated Control Difference
∆TotInvest (ATT) 0.0061∗∗ -0.0021 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0029)
Q 2.4485 2.0974 0.3511
(0.2709) (0.1747) (0.2870)
Cashflow -0.0055 0.0263 -0.0317
(0.0182) (0.0048) (0.0186)
Size 7.4919 8.1280 -0.6362
(0.4254) (0.2949) (0.4600)




Table 1.17: Channel – Changes in the Proportion of Government Purchases
The table shows that treated firms lose their share of government purchases in the year following the loss of political
connections. Lose Connection takes a value of one when a firm loses a political connection during the quarter. The
firm outcome variable, ∆GovtSale/Sales (changes in annual sales to government scaled by total annual sales), is
constructed as the average GovtSale/Sales in the four quarters following the event of political connection loss minus
the average GovtSale/Sales during the four quarters before the event. The control groups are (1) the firms that
share the same lobbying firm with the treated firms or (2) the firms that are connected to a (non-treated) Senator
representing the same state as the treated firms. Lobby Spending is the total amount of annual lobbying expenditure.
# of Lobbyists is the total number of lobbyists hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and
therefore Lobby Spending and # of Lobbyist are lagged by four quarters. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC
level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of
statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Govt Sale2 ∆ Govt Sale2 ∆ Govt Sale2 ∆ Govt Sale2
Connection Loss -0.0064∗∗ -0.0068∗∗ -0.0063∗∗ -0.0067∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0029)
Number of Lobbyists -0.0103 -0.0121
(0.0147) (0.0152)
Lobby Spending -1.1258∗∗ -0.9856∗∗
(0.5215) (0.4959)
Q -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Size -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Cashflow 0.0084 0.0083 0.0112 0.0109
(0.0121) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0135)
State × Year-Quarter FE No Yes No Yes
Industry × Year-Quarter FE Yes No Yes No
Observations 9305 9305 9305 9305
R2 0.198 0.219 0.201 0.221
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.18: Effects on the Competitors – Changes in the Overall Sales and the
Proportion of Government Purchases
The table shows that competitors of the treated firms gain their share of government purchases in the year following
the loss of political connections. Competitor is an indicator variable which takes value of one if a firm is defined to be
one of the competitors of the treated firms. The competitor is defined by Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Phillips text-
based network industry classification (TNIC). The firm outcome variable, ∆Sales and ∆GovtSale/Sales (changes in
annual sales to government scaled by total annual sales), are constructed as the average in the four quarters following
the event of political connection loss minus the average during the four quarters before the event. Lobby Spending
is the total amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the total number of lobbyists hired by each
firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of Lobbyist are lagged by four
quarters. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **,
and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Competitor}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Competitor}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
∆Sales ∆GovtSale/Sales
Competitor 10.9040∗∗ 10.8941∗∗ 0.0010∗∗ 0.0010∗∗
(5.3565) (5.3571) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Lobby Spending -85.6277 -0.0707
(372.8161) (0.1970)
# of Lobbyists 7.3113 -0.0002
(5.2469) (0.0022)
Q 5.1052∗∗∗ 5.1002∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.4495) (0.4495) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size 27.1018∗∗∗ 27.1084∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001
(1.6315) (1.6318) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cashflow -4.9601 -4.8996 0.0003 0.0003
(4.2708) (4.2626) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Cash holdings 13.2901∗∗ 13.2624∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0014∗∗
(6.0442) (6.0450) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 236301 236301 225273 225273
R2 0.093 0.093 0.021 0.021
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Table 1.19: Real Effects - Excluding Close Elections
The table shows that political capital is substitutable for physical capital investment. Lose Connection takes a value
of one when a firm loses a political connection during the quarter. The dependent variable is the average of investment
outcomes in the four quarters following the exit event minus the average of investment outcomes during the four
quarters before the event. The firm outcome variables are R&D, CapEx, and TotInvest (= R&D+CapEx). Lobby
Spending is the total amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the total number of lobbyists hired
by each firm. Lobbying data are at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of Lobbyists are lagged
by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry is defined at the
two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest ∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest
Lose Connection 0.0023∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0022∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0016)
Lobby Spending -0.2887 0.1485 -0.2167
(0.2339) (0.2470) (0.4638)
# of Lobbyists 0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0022
(0.0091) (0.0036) (0.0138)
Q -0.0006∗∗ 0.0002∗ -0.0004 -0.0007∗∗ 0.0002∗ -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Cashflow 0.0009 0.0023∗ 0.0090 0.0008 0.0023 0.0084
(0.0042) (0.0013) (0.0077) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0078)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9160 9022 9022 9160 9022 9022
R2 0.075 0.253 0.114 0.073 0.252 0.114
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Table 1.20: Real Effects - Excluding Scandals
The table shows that political capital is substitutable for physical capital investment. Lose Connection takes a value
of one when a firm loses a political connection during the quarter. The dependent variable is the average of investment
outcomes in the four quarters following the exit event minus the average of investment outcomes during the four
quarters before the event. The firm outcome variables are R&D, CapEx, and TotInvest (= R&D+CapEx). Lobby
Spending is the total amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the total number of lobbyists hired
by each firm. Lobbying data are at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of Lobbyists are lagged
by four quarters. Industry×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry is defined at the
two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γLobby Spendingi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
Y i,(t+1,t+4) − Y i,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyistsi,t−4 + Ind× νt + i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest ∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest
Lose Connection 0.0022∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0022∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0014)
Lobbying Spending -0.3240 0.1483 -0.2206
(0.2692) (0.2446) (0.4620)
# of Lobbyists -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0024
(0.0103) (0.0036) (0.0138)
Q -0.0006∗ 0.0002∗ -0.0004 -0.0007∗∗ 0.0002∗ -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Size -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Cashflow 0.0028 0.0024∗ 0.0090 0.0024 0.0023 0.0083
(0.0054) (0.0013) (0.0077) (0.0054) (0.0014) (0.0078)
Industry×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9254 9118 9118 9254 9118 9118
R2 0.074 0.251 0.113 0.072 0.250 0.112
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Additional Tests
Table 1.21: Changes in Lobbying Spending After the Exit Event (State×Year-
Quarter FE)
This table shows that firms that lose political connections (treatment group) decrease the amount of lobbying ex-
penditures in the following years. Lose Connection takes a value of one when a firm loses a political connection
during the quarter. LobbySpend is log(dollar amount spent on lobbying+1). ∆LobbySpend(y+1) is the average of
lobby spending in the four quarters following the exit event minus the average of lobby spending during the four
quarters before the event. ∆LobbySpend(y+2) is the average of lobby spending in the five-to-eight quarters following
the event of political connection loss minus the average of lobby spending during the four quarters after the event.
State×Year-Quarter fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level.
The standard errors are clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical
significance, respectively.
Yi,(t+1,t+4) −Yi,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyists or Lobby Spendingi,t−4
+Firm Controlsi,t−1 + Statej × νt + Indk + i,j,k,t
Yi,(t+5,t+8) −Yi,(t+1,t+4) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyists or Lobby Spendingi,t−4
+Firm Controlsi,t−1 + Statej × νt + Indk + i,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Lobbying Spending(y+1) ∆ Lobbying Spending(y+2) ∆ Lobbying Spending(y+3)
Lose Connection -1.1007∗∗∗ -0.7235∗∗∗ -0.3820
(0.3865) (0.2401) (0.2495)
Q 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0033 -0.0016
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Size -0.0098∗∗ -0.0394∗∗∗ -0.0462∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0034)
Cashflow 0.2263∗∗∗ 0.0927∗∗∗ 0.1065∗∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0305) (0.0336)
Cash-holdings 0.1139∗∗∗ -0.0245 -0.0105
(0.0410) (0.0296) (0.0338)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
State×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 245554 225600 196380
R2 0.054 0.059 0.071
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Table 1.22: Real Effects Using the Whole Sample (State×Year-Quarter FE)
This table shows that the political capital is substitutable for physical capital. The outcome variables are R&D,
CapEx, and TotInvest (= R&D + CapEx). The dependent variable is the average of investment outcomes in the
four quarters following the exit event minus the average of investment outcomes during the four quarters before the
event. Lobby Spending is the amount of annual lobbying expenditure. # of Lobbyists is the number of lobbyists
hired by each firm. Lobbying data is at the annual frequency and therefore Lobby Spending and # of Lobbyists are
lagged by four quarters. State×Year-Quarter fixed effects and Industry fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Yi,(t+1,t+4) −Yi,(t−4,t−1) = α+ βI{Lose Connection}i,t + γ# of Lobbyists or Lobby Spendingi,t−4
+Firm Controlsi,t−1 + Statej × νt + Indk + i,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest ∆R&D ∆CapEx ∆TotInvest
Lose Connection 0.0018∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Lobby Spending -0.5061∗∗∗ 0.0000 -0.5567∗∗
(0.1457) (0.0842) (0.2190)
# of Lobbyists -0.0051∗ 0.0001 -0.0057
(0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0038)
Q -0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Size -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Cashflow 0.0019∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0013)
Cash holdings 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State×Yr-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 239088 227638 227638 239088 227638 227638
R2 0.027 0.042 0.033 0.026 0.042 0.033
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SPENDING ON PRIVATE
INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS-SHOCK
2.1 Introduction
The effectiveness of fiscal policy as a device to manage private sector’s economic activities has
always been at the center of both academic research and public debate. In the standard Keynesian
model, an increase in government spending increases total demand, and as a result, increases
total investment and employment. The “multiplier effect” is a key argument that has been used
to advocate government spending as an effective tool to stimulate private sector’s investment.
Neoclassical economists, however, disagree with this view. They argue that government spending
can “crowd out” consumer spending and private investment, either through the interest rate or
the tax channel. Empirical researches on this topic provide conflicting answers as well. Estimates
of the fiscal multiplier generally range from 0.6 to 2, and is far from being conclusive. The main
challenge in analyzing the effect of government spending on private investment is to identify changes
in government spending that are truly exogenous to the economic environment.
In this paper, we examine the causal effects of government spending on private sector’s investment
by using a new empirical approach. Our identification is based on two observations. First, federal
funds allocated to local governments are largely dependent on the local population level. Second,
the methods used to estimate the local population level is different during the census years, when
the decennial census provides the most accurate population count, and the non-census years, when
an estimation method is utilized. Hence, the population growth discontinuity in census years caused
by the two different estimation methods is a source of exogenous shock to local population count,
and hence is also a source of exogenous shock to the cross-sectional allocation of federal funds to
the regions. Serrato and Wingender (2011a) first explore Census-Shock and successfully argue that
the shock creates exogenous cross-sectional variation in government spending.
During census years, the population counts can be considered as accurate and correctly reflect
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the true population.1 During non-census years, the Census Bureau use an estimation method
called the “post-censal” population estimate. Post-censal population estimates are computed by
adding population changes obtained from administrative data, such as birth, death, and migration,
to the most recent census population count. Since post-censal population estimates use imperfect
administrative data, this counting process introduce book-keeping errors to the population statistics
in non-census years.
For each decennial census year, we define Census-Shock as the log difference between the post-
censal population estimates and the concurrent census population counts. Census-Shock is essen-
tially the measurement error from administrative data accumulated over the non-census years, and
is independent of any economic factors. Our identifying assumption is that the function relating
the population growth and firm investment opportunities does not share exactly the same discon-
tinuity as the function that relates the population growth to population revision due to the census
counts. Put differently, the gap between post-censal population estimate and the true census counts
is purely due to administrative error, and is orthogonal to firm investment opportunities that are
related to regional population growth.
We utilize Census-Shock as an instrument and exploit the cross-regional variation in federal
spending to examine the effects of public spending on the behavior of local firms. This cross-
sectional identification creates a unique laboratory where we can rule out alternative channels of
influences such as changes in nominal interest rate or any anticipated changes in future tax rate.
Nominal interest rate is the same across all regions. Likewise, since federal spending is financed
by federal taxes, and tax payers living in regions with a positive spending shock should not expect
any relative differences in tax rate compared to other regions. In other words, changes in federal
fund allocation due to Census-Shock can be considered as virtually free windfall of money from
the recipient’s perspective. We investigate the effect of such exogenous changes in federal funds on
local firms investment behavior. This approach differs from most studies that focus on estimating
the aggregate effect of government spending.2
Our results strongly support the substitution, or crowding-out effect of government spending.
We find that, in response to an exogenous increase in government spending, local firms significantly
reduce their capital investment and R&D investment. For a 5% increase in Census-Shock relative
1As required by the Constitution, the census has been conducted every 10 years since 1790.
2Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) also investigate the firm-level responses to the state-level spending shock due
to congressional committee chairmanship changes
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to the mean at the county-level, the representative local firm reduces its capital investment by
roughly 7% and R&D investment by 3%, relative to the mean. This contraction in investment is
followed by reductions in both employment growth and sales growth. This pattern is robust across
various model specifications at both the county- and state-level.
We further investigate possible explanations for the causal relationship that government spending
reduces firm investments. First, we find that firms which are more geographically concentrated
reduce their investment more in respond to a positive government spending shock. This suggests
that firms with more geographically concentrated operation have less flexibility to mitigate public
spending shocks, perhaps due to less than perfect mobility of production factors across regions,
such as labor. Second, we find that smaller-sized firms reduce their capital investment more than
larger-sized firms. Small-sized firms are likely to be more resource-constrained and have less flexible
operations, and hence are more affected by government spending shocks. Most importantly, we also
find that firms that are located in regions with higher employment rates decrease their investment
more severely compared to otherwise similar firms in regions with lower employment rates. The
last piece of evidence points towards labor as a potential channel where government spending can
reduce private sectors investment activities.
We provide direct evidence for the labor channel as a mechanism behind our documented
crowding-out effect of government spending. More specifically, we look at the effect of an ex-
ogenous change in government hiring on private sector’s employment growth. Using Census-Shock
as an instrument for government hiring and federal wage expenditure, we find that an exogenous
increase in government hiring and wage spending decreases private sector’s subsequent employment
growth.
Our empirical findings are consistent with models having microeconomic foundations of labor-
and-leisure trade-off. That is, an increase in fiscal spending allocated to a county results in an
increase in the consumption of leisure of a marginal worker, and thus increase the wage level.
When the regional employment rate is closer to the full employment level, it is even more costly
for firms to hire an additional worker at the margin. Firms with lower capability and flexibility in
dealing with that shock should exhibit a larger crowding-out effect. This channel can be true even
when employment rate is relatively low, since not all types of workers are perfectly substitutable.
Moreover, given that labor forces are not perfectly mobile across regions, an increase in public
hiring decreases the labor pool for the local firms, and therefore crowding-out their employment
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growth. This evidence is consistent with the broader explanation that government spending can
adversely affect private sector’s production factors. Taken all together, the results are consistent
with the crowding out effect of government spending, not through the traditional interest rate or
tax rate channel, but through the labor channel.
There is a substantial literature that analyzes the effects of government spending on the economy.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007) identify shocks to govern-
ment spending using a structural vector autoregressive models approach that relies on decision and
implementation lags in fiscal policy. Papers that utilize VAR techniques typically find supports
for a positive effect of government spending shocks. In contrast, papers that adopt narrative ap-
proaches and use Ramey and Shapiro (1998) “war dates” and focus on geo-political events that
forecast a large rise in defense spending unrelated to the U.S. economic condition, find a negative
effect of government spending shocks (e.g., Barro (1981), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Ramey (2011))
One common disadvantage of prior approaches is the infrequent shocks as well as potential
correlation with confounding factors affecting overall economics outcomes including increases in
tax rate, or changes in consumer sentiment such as patriotism. Our paper uses cross-regional
(cross-county and cross-state) variation in government spending, which allows us to control for the
overall macroeconomic variables that is common to every regions in U.S., and thus effectively rules
out the confounding channels such as expected changes in tax rate or monetary policy. Similarly to
this approach, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) use cross-state variation in the state-level military
procurement spending elasticity to aggregate military spending changes to measure the effects on
state output. Clemens and Miran (2012) uses the variation in the stringency of a state’s rules in
the balanced budget requirements to estimate the income multiplier during the periods of fiscal
stress and spending cuts. Shoag (2010) instruments state-level spending with idiosyncratic pension
returns to measure the effect on income and employment.
Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) examines firm-level responses to exogenous variation in state-
level federal expenditures using 232 instances of senator or representative of a particular state
ascends to the chairmanship of a powerful congressional committee. They also finds a crowding-
out effect of an exogenous increase in government spending. One major advantage of our empirical
approach is that by using population count revision as an exogenous shock, we can look at virtually
all states (and hence all firms) over the same and broader time horizon. Our paper is distinctive
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in that the fiscal spending that we are looking at is not discretionary but formula-based non-
discretionary spendings. It is also noteworthy that our paper directly measures the firm-level
responses to the exogenous changes in federal spending allocation using micro-level firm data.
Finally, this paper contribute evidence on the ramification of imperfect labor mobility. The
literature documents that geographical mobility of workers are limited, and wage-level across dif-
ferent localities are not fully arbitraged away (e.g., Topel (1986)). Our analysis provide empirical
evidence that is consistent with limited mobility of labor forces. Since our study exploits cross-
county variation, the results in our paper suggests that labor market can be not fully integrated at
the county-level. From the policy-maker’s point of view, this result is particularly interesting and
important.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I explains the sources and the
characteristics of the data. Section II discusses the empirical identification and methodologies.
Section III provides the main empirical findings and discussions. The last section concludes.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Data Sources
We obtain firm-level data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat annual tapes. We use the firm’s
headquarter information in Compustat to merge firm-level financial data with the federal spending
data at the county and state-level. We deflate Compustat financial variables into 1985 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Data on federal spending allocation from 1980 to 2006 at the state and county-level are obtained
from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) published annually by the Census Bureau.
Data from 1983 and onward are available at the Census Bureau’s CFFR website.3 The data for 1981
and 1982 can be found from the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds and from the Federal
Outlays dataset.4 CFFR offers a detailed data on the geographic allocation of federal spending
down to the county level. Federal spending consists of more than a thousand programs. These
programs are categorized into nine broad categories based on purpose and type of recipients. The
categories are: Direct Payments to Individuals, Direct Payments for Retirement and Disability,
3http://www.census.gov/govs/cffr/
4ICPSR 6043 and ICPSR 6064
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Grants, Procurement and Contracts, Salaries and Wages of federal employees and Direct Loans.
We exclude Direct Payments Other than for Individuals which consist mainly of insurance payments
such as crop and natural disaster insurance. Finally, we exclude the Insurance and Guaranteed
Loans category since they represent contingent liabilities and not actual spending. Federal spending
data are converted into 1985 dollars. For each year, we have on average over 3,000 counties in the
sample.
To construct the instrumental variable Census-Shock at the county level, we use post-censal
population estimates published by the Census Bureau from 1971 to 2007 as well as the decennial
Census numbers5. The post-censal population estimates are based on the components of population
changes including migration, births, and deaths. Data are downloaded from the Census Bureau
and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) archive. Pre-1990
post-censal data are no longer available from the Census Bureau’s website. For the years1971 to
1974, we use the Population Estimates of Counties in the United States from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research6. For years the 1975 to 1978, we use the data from
the Federal-State Cooperative Program.7 No post-censal population estimates were published for
the years 1979, 1980, 1989, 1990 and 2000. For the years 1981 to 1988, we use population data from
the County Statistics File 4 (CO-STAT 4).8 Data for census years and non-census years from 1991
onward are taken directly from the Census Bureau’s website.9 Local and state population estimates
are produced jointly by the Census Bureau and state agencies. The Federal-State Cooperative
Program has produced the population estimates used for federal funds allocation and other official
uses since 1972.
Data on deaths and births comes from the Vital Statistics and can be found from the NBER
website for the years 1970 to 1978.10 We use the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
(CDC) Compressed Mortality Files for the years 1979 to 1988.11 We use data tables published in
the Vital Statistics, “Live births by county of occurrence and place of residence” for years 1989
and 1990. Data for 1991 to 2007 are taken directly from the Census Bureau’s components of
5The distinction between postcensal and intercensal is important. The latter are retrospectively revised to account
for the error of closure in Census years whereas the former are the contemporaneous estimates produced every year
to tract population growth. Intercensal population estimates are not relevant for our study since federal spending
only depends on the contemporaneous estimates.
6Population Estimates study ICPSR 7500
7Population Estimates study ICPSR 7841 and ICPSR 7843





growth data files available on the Census Bureau’s website. Data on county level deaths are taken
from the NBER’s Compressed Mortality micro data files from 1970 to 1988 and from the CDC’s
Compressed Mortality tabulated files from 1989 to 2006. County level deaths for 2007 to 2009 were
taken directly from the Census Bureau’s components of growth files.
Data on county-to-county migration is obtained from the IRS’s Statistics of Income migration
files. Years 1978 to 1992 were taken from the County-to-County, State-to-State, and County
Income Study Files, 1978-1992 (ICPSR 2937) and Population Migration Between Counties Based
on Individual Income Tax Returns, 1982-1983 (ICPSR 8477). The most recent years are available
directly from the IRS SOI’s website.12
County-level government hiring data is from the Census Bureau website.13 The dataset provides
the number of full-time and part-time employees hired by the federal government and also includes
data on the total payroll (or wage spending).
2.2.2 Variable Construction and Data Selection
This section introduce the constructions of the main variables used in this study. Firm’s financial
variables are scaled by the beginning-of-the-year book value of assets. Capxt/At−1 is a firm’s
capital investment scaled by book value of assets. R&D/At−1 is a firm’s research and development
spending divided by book value of assets. Cashflow is defined as income before depreciation and
amortization scaled by the beginning-of-the-year book value of assets. EmpGrowth is a firm’s
employment growth measured as the log change between the number of employees in year t and
t − 1. SalesGrowth the change in the firm’s total sales scaled by the beginning-of-the-year total
sales. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market-to-book ratio of firm total assets, where the numerator
equals the market value of equity plus book assets minus the sum of the book value of common
equity and deferred taxes and the denominator is book value of assets.
We exclude firms that are categorized as Financials, Utility, and Government from the sample.
We also exclude firms that have missing or negative values of book assets. Following the literature,
we remove firms that experienced recent significant changes such as Mergers & Acquisitions and
exclude firm-year observations with more than 100% changes in sales, number of employments or
book assets.14 We eliminate firm-year observations that have Q larger than 10. To control for
12http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/
13http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/
14For example, refer to Almeida, Campello, and Weisbenner (2004) or Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010)
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the effects of outliers, financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final
sample spans from 1981 to 2006 and has 115,880 firm-year observations.
We construct variables that measures changes in the federal spending at both the county and state
level. ∆GovSpend is the log changes in government spending. PopGrowthRate is the population
growth rates, defined as the log change in the population.
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of the main variables used in this study. The mean and
median of Compustat variables are very comparable to the Compustat universe for the sample
period, and this reflects that our sample well represents Compustat firms. The mean annual
growth rate of county-level federal spending is 2.9%. The mean annual population growth rate at
the county-level is 0.3%.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Figure 2.1 shows the annual mean population growth rate at the county-level. The feature that
stands out the most in the figure is the population growth discontinuity in the census years. In
1980 and 2000, the average population growth rate at the county-level is significantly larger than
the moving average, which indicates that on average there is significant under-counting of the
population rate over the period prior to those census years. On the other hand, in 1990, the
average population growth rate is significantly smaller than the moving average, which indicates
that on average there is significant over counting of the population growth rate prior to 1990. This
observation motivates our identification strategy, which we introduce in the next section.
2.3.1 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy exploits the sharp discontinuities in the population growth rate in census
years. The first observation that motivates our identification strategy is that federal funds allocated
to the local government is largely a function of the local population level. As a suggestive example,
the The Wall Street Journal article “Census Rejects City Challenge” reports a case of New York
City’s challenge to its 2010 population figures on April 1, 2012 as follows:
“The U.S. Census Bureau has rejected New York City’s challenge to its 2010 popula-
tion figures, maintaining there was no reason to revise its count of just less than 8.2
million people. The city claimed the census fell short by roughly 200,000 people, mostly
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because large numbers of housing units were mistakenly classified as vacant. [...] The
final number matters greatly to the city, as it is used to determine federal
aid distributions. [...] In a letter to the Census Bureau, Mr. Bloomberg said city
demographers believed there were undercounts throughout New York. [...]”
The quoted news article manifests the factual building block of our identification strategy. A large
number of direct federal spending distribution uses annual population estimates to allocate fiscal
spending into each state and county level. The quote emphasizes the significance of the amount
of federal funding determined by the census numbers, since it shows that the local government
greatly cares about their census counts. Official government reports also illustrate the importance
of population level in determining the geographic allocation of federal spending. For example, from
the Government Accountancy Report in 1998:
“Population counts, as derived from the decennial census, are frequently used to ap-
portion federal grants to states and units of local government. Of the $185 billion in
population-based grant funding for fiscal year 1998, formula grants composed 95 per-
cent of the amount and discretionary grants accounted for the rest. Because of formula
grant programs’ reliance on population counts, adjusting these counts based on a PES
could potentially redistribute federal funding among states and localities.”
Further more, Blumerman and Vidal (2009) Governments Division Report Series finds that
approximately $446.4 billion in federal grant and direct assistance money is annually distributed
based in part or in whole on population and income data.
The second observation that motivates the identification strategy is that decennial census creates
significant discontinuity in the population growth rate due to the use of two different counting
methods in non-census years and in census years. As required by the Constitution, the census has
been conducted every 10 years since 1790. The Census Bureau place strong emphasis on getting
an accurate count. Census takers follow up by visiting household that fail to return their form
by mail. As a result, the population count during census years can be considered as accurate and
correctly reflect the U.S.’s population statistics.
During non-census years, however, the Census Bureau uses an estimation method called the
“post-censal” population estimate. Post-censal population estimates are computed by adding pop-
ulation changes obtained from administrative data, such as birth, death and migration, to the
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most recent census population count. Since post-censal population estimates use imperfect admin-
istrative data, this counting process introduce book-keeping errors to the population statistics in
non-census years.15 Since the census is conducted only every 10 years, the difference between the
census counts and the concurrent population estimates contains measurement error accumulated
over the previous decade.
To illustrate, Figure 2.1 shows the annual average county-level population growth rate from
1970 to 2006. Population growth rate shows a clear abnormal jump in each of the census years.
The discontinuities in the population counts are purely due to the administrative error and is
independent of economics factors. Combine this with the earlier observation that federal spending
is largely a function of the local population level, the discontinuity in the local population count
can be utilized as an exogenous shock to the federal fund allocated to the local regions. In other
words, we expect federal government spending to adjust accordingly to address the error in the
local population count in the non-census years that follow census years. More importantly, this
adjustment in government spending is unrelated to local economics environment.
We define Census-Shock as the log difference between the most recent population estimates and
concurrent census counts, which captures the administrative book-keeping errors that accumulated
over the non-census years. Figure 2.2 shows that the distribution of the county-level Census-Shock
for the three census years 1980, 1990 and 2000. The distribution is close to normal and suggests
that the error is not systematically positive or negative and can be considered as random.
We display the geographic distribution of the Census-Shock in Figure2.3. We further check the
orthogonality of Census-Shock to other confounding county-specific hidden characteristics that can
influence investment opportunities of firms. Since count-specific social and economic characteristics
are highly persistent and is highly serially correlated, we test whether county-level Census-Shock
is itself serially correlated.
Figure 2.4 shows the scatter plots of the serial-correlation of the county-level Census-Shock.
The left and right panel plot serial-correlations of county-level Census-Shock observations between
the year 1980-1990 and year 1990-2000, respectively. The fitted lines are added to each serial-
correlation plots. In both plots, the slopes are flat and not statistically different from zero, which
suggests that Census-Shock realization is random and not concentrated in certain areas with some
hidden county-specific characteristics. These plots demonstrate that counties show virtually no
15Government estimate of natural population growth in population is produced using data on births and deaths
while migration is estimated using data on tax returns, Medicare, school enrollment, and automobile registration.
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serial correlation in the shocks. This observation confirms that Census-Shock are measurement
error. As the plot shows that the shock does not exhibit persistence, we can safely argue that
Census-Shock are not produced as a by-product of county-specific omitted variables such as illegal
immigration that are known to be highly persistent.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 First Stage Results
Our first stage regression specification is defined as follows:
∆GovSpendyc+t = α+ βCensus-shockyc +
θGeographic Controlsyc+t−1 + δFEs + 
where yc is the census year (1980, 1990 and 2000) and ∆GovSpendyc+t is the log change in govern-
ment spending t years after the census year yc. Table 2.2 shows the first-stage results. The sample
period is from 1980 to 2006. Geographic Controls include lagged state-level unemployment growth
and state-level GDP growth. All models include year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the state-year level. The results are economically and statistically significant. Census-shock is
a strong predictor for the changes in the allocation of federal spending in the years that follows
the census year, and the predictive power is robust when we include geographic controls in the
regression model.
Having introduced the construction of our identification approach, we next test for the effect of
government spending on private investment.
2.4.2 Baseline Results
Our baseline IV regression specification to estimate the effect on firm investment activities caused
by the exogenous changes in government spending is defined as follows:
Capxi,t/Ai,t−1 = α+ β∆GovSpend IVt−1 + γFirm Controlsi,t−1 + δFEs + 
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Control variables include Q, Cashflow and Leverage.16 Geographic controls include natural
population growth rate to further control for the potential correlation between the population
growth and regional specific unobserved characteristics that can affect firms’ unobserved investment
opportunities.
Our key coefficient of interest is β. A priori, the predicted sign of β is unclear. A positive value
of β coefficient suggests that an exogenous increase in government spending stimulates private
sector’s capital investment. A negative value of β implies that an exogenous increase in government
spending crowding-out private sector’s capital investment.
Table 2.3 presents the main results that match firms location and government spending at the
state level. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) present simple OLS regression of firm-level capital
investment spending on previous year’s change in government spending. Columns (2), (4), (6), and
(8) regress firm-level capital investment spending on instrumented change in government spending
obtained from the first stage regression presented in Table 2.2. Columns (1) and (2) include year
fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) include year and state fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) include
year and industry fixed effects. Columns (7) and (8) include year, industry, and firm fixed effects.
The results for regular OLS regression is not significant and the sign of β changes with differ-
ent specification. Un-instrumented government spending is endogenous to the conditions of the
local economy. It is possible that government may allocate more federal funds into areas in higher
needs, or regions with low economic prospect. In this case, federal spending allocation can be more
concentrated into firms located in relatively poorer or declining areas with inferior investment
opportunities. On the other hand, it is also possible that regions with higher growth opportu-
nity attract more federal funds, if government thinks the return of investment is higher in that
way. In this case, it is also natural for local firms to increase investment, given good investment
opportunities. Increase in government spending can be either negatively or positively related to
private sector’s spending, both variable caused by deterioration or improvement in local economics
condition.
Consistent with the concern that government spending is endogenous to the local-level firm
outcomes, the simple OLS regression results show that government spending has statistically in-
significant and non-robust effect on local firms’ capital investment.
In contrast, using Census-Shock to identify exogenous changes in government spending yield
16The results are robust across various specifications of control variables. We include leverage since it is highly
significant in the investment equation
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significant and robust results. In columns (2), (4) and (6), the coefficients on ∆GovSpend IV,
which is obtained from the first stage regression in Table 2.2, is statistically and economically
significant, and is robust to alternative specifications. A 5% increase in the local population count
due to Census-Shock results in an annual average decrease of 4.5% in the local firms’ capital
investment. The coefficients on ∆GovSpend IV is hardly affected by the inclusion of the firm fixed
effects.
As a robustness check, we replicate our estimation methodology at the state-level. For the
state-level analysis, the Census-Shock is defined at state-level and the government spending is also
aggregated at the state-level. Similarly, Census-Shock at the state-level is the difference between the
population count estimates prior to the census year and the actually population number constructed
in the census year, computed at the state-level. We use Census-Shock at the state level to identify
exogenous shocks to the federal spending allocate to the state and examine the investment behavior
of the firms located in that state.
It may not be a priori clear how the magnitude of the elasticity of firm investment with respect
to the county-level government spending compares to that of its state-level counterpart. Negative
spillover effect across firms in neighboring counties can lead us to underestimate the magnitude
of elasticity. That is, given a positive Census-Shock and the resulting government spending shock
in a county, firms located in the county decrease their investment, and this changes further hit
other firms located in the neighboring counties. On the other hand, if firms in neighboring counties
readily substitutes the decreased investment behavior of firms in a county with positive fiscal
spending shock, our county-level analysis may lead us to overestimate the crowding-out effect.
2.4.3 Government Spending and Other Outcomes
Having established that exogenous increases in government spending cause local firms to reduce
their capital investment, we set out to determine whether public spending affects firms’ other
behaviors that are also consistent with the crowding-outing out effect. More specifically, we look
at firms’ R&D investment, firms’ future employment growth, and future sales growth. We run the
following regression:
Outcomei,t = α+ β∆GovSpend IVt−1 + γFirm Controlsi,t−1 + δFEs + 
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where Outcome are the following variables: R&D/A is research and development spending divided
by book assets, EmployGrowth is the change in the number of employees scaled by the beginning-of-
the-year number of employees, and SalesGrowth is the change in the sales scaled by the beginning-
of-the-year sales. Control variables are firm characteristics, Q, Cashflow, and Leverage.
All the Table 2.4 presents the results. Coefficients are significant and the signs are consistent
with the substitution or crowding-out effects of government spending. When a state experience
a positive Census-Shock of 5%, the local firm reduce its R&D investment by 3% on average. We
also find that government spending reduce firms’ future employment growth and sales growth.
Complementarity between labor and capital predicts that retrenchment in capital expenditures
may further decrease firm’s subsequent employment growth rate. If corporate retrenchment have
real effect in terms of firms’ competitiveness in product market, we expect to observe a negative
effect in firms’ product market performance such as sales growth.
The result that show firms reduce their future employment growth is particularly interesting,
which gives us an indication for the potential channel through which the crowding-out effect can
occur. We explore this in the next section.
2.5 Channels of the Crowding-out Effect
2.5.1 Firm and Geographical Characteristics
Exogenous increase in federal spending allocation, a majority of which are direct transfer to indi-
viduals, is not subject to county-specific increase in tax rate or local government borrowing. In
response to the free windfall of extra income, individuals living in those regions are more likely to
increase their consumption and leisure, and this increase the local wage and labor cost as a results.
Serrato and Wingender (2011b) provide empirical evidendence that the relative wage level goes up
in counties with positive government spending shock induced by Census-Shock. The resulting de-
cline in the marginal productivity of capital compels companies to scale back in capital investment
as well as R&D investment. Although the local population have more money in their pocket to
spend, they can consume the goods produced in other counties given that product market in US is
sufficiently integrated across the nation. Even if there is income effect, that prediction goes against
our empirical result. For local firms, however, price of the production factors including labor cost
and land prices go up.
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In this subsection, we present evidence that suggests immobile production factors such as labor
can be the channel of the crowding-out effect of government spending. To explore this hypothesis,
we first test whether the exogenous change in federal spending have differential effects in regions
with different labor market conditions.
We use the average of the unemployment rate in the past three years to capture the cross-county
differences in the local labor market conditions. By interacting the local unemployment rate with
the instrumented government spending, we investigate how the labor market market conditions (or
labor supply shortage) affect the local firms’ response to the government spending shock. Consistent
with the conjecture that government spending affects production factor of labor, we find that the
degree of corporate investment retrenchment is smaller for the firms located in region’s with higher
unemployment rate. Column (2) of Table 2.5 shows the result for this test. The coefficient of
the interaction term ∆GovSpend IV × Unemployment is positive and statistically significant,
which means that for regions with lower unemployment rate, the effect of unexpected government
spending on local firms’ investment is stronger.
Next, we test whether the effect of government spending is different for firms that do not have
the capacity to absorb shocks to their production factors. More specifically, we want to see if the
effect of public spending is larger for smaller-sized firms and firms that are more geographically
concentrated. Smaller-sized firms do not have the resources to offset shocks to their production
function. Likewise, firms that are more geographically concentrated do not have the flexibility
to transfer their production to more favorable regions, since many of production factors are not
perfectly mobile.
Consistent with the story that exogenous increases in government spending has a adverse effect
on the local firms’ production factor, such as labor, we find that the effect is stronger for smaller-
sized firms and firms that are more geographically concentrated.17 The results can be found in
column (3) and (4) of Table 2.5. The coefficients of the interaction terms ∆GovSpend IV × Size
and ∆GovSpend IV × Dispersion are both statistically and economically significant. The signs
are consistent with our prediction.
17We specially thank Diego Garcia and Øyvind Norli for the geographic dispersion data in Garcia and Norli (2012).
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2.5.2 Direct Evidence for the Labor Channel
We further investigate the possibility that local labor market is the mechanism through which
the crowding-out effect can occur. We directly test whether an exogenous increase in government
hiring and wage spending to a region adversely affects the local firms hiring decision. To deal
with the potential endogeneity between the government hiring and corporate sector hiring, we
instrument the changes in government hiring with Census-Shock. However, it is noteworthy that
the endogenous relation between government hiring and private-sector hiring is more likely to be
positively correlated, while the crowding-out effect suggests a negative relation.
Table 2.6 reports the empirical results on the labor channel of the crowding-out effect. To
measure government hiring, we adopt various measures such as the changes in the growth rate of
the county-level full-time government employees, the changes in the the growth rate of the county-
level total government hiring, and the change in the growth rate of total payroll received by the total
government employees. The dependent variable is firm-level EmployGrowth, which is the change
in the number of employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year number of employees. Columns
(2), (4) and (6) show the second stage regression of EmpGrowth on the three instrumented public
hiring variables: ∆TotalPubHire, ∆CountyPubHire and ∆PubPayroll. ∆TotalPubHire is the
change in total number of government employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year total number
of government employees. ∆CountyPubHire is the change in the county-level full-time public
employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year number of employee. ∆PubPayroll is the change in
the payroll received by government employees scaled by the previous year’s payroll. Firm controls
include firm’s Q, Size, and Leverage. All tests include year, county and industry fixed effects.
The second stage regression results show robust negative relationship between government hiring
growth rate and private sector’s hiring growth rate. All measures of changes in government spend-
ing on wage and hiring cause local firms to reduce their future employment growth. Increase in
government hiring decrease labor supply and increase local labor cost in the region and adversely
affect the corporate sector’s hiring decision. The results are consistent with the crowding-out effect
of government spending through the labor channel.
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2.6 Conclusion
We examine the causal effect of public sector’s spending on private sector’s investment using a new
empirical approach. Our identification is based on two observations. First, federal funds allocated
to the local governments are largely dependent on the local population level. Second, the methods
used to estimate the local population level is different during non-census years and in census years,
when the true population count is obtained. Hence, the population growth discontinuity in census
years caused by the different estimation methods is a source of exogenous shock to local population
count, and hence is also a source of exogenous shock to the cross-sectional allocation of federal
funds to the regions. We define the discontinuity of the local population growth in census years as
Census-shock.
We show that when a county experiences a positive Census-Shock of 5%, firms’ capital and R&D
investment is reduced by roughly by 7% and 3%, respectively. This contraction in investment is
followed by reductions in both employment growth and sales growth. This pattern is robust across
various model specifications at both the county- and state-level.
We then investigate possible explanations for the causal effect of government spending on firm’s
investments. We find that firms with geographically concentrated operations and firms that are
smaller in size are more affected by an exogenous increase in federal spending. Geographically
concentrated firms have less flexibility to mitigate spending shocks, perhaps due to less than perfect
mobility of production factors across regions, such as labor. Small-sized firms are also likely to be
more resource-constrained and have less capacity to absorb any spending shocks.
We also find that firms that are located in regions with higher employment rates decrease their
investment more compared to otherwise similar firms in regions with lower employment rates. More
directly, we show that an exogenous increase in government hiring and wage spending reduces
subsequent private sector’s employment growth. This finding is consistent with models having
microeconomic foundations of labor-and-leisure trade-off. Labor forces are not perfectly mobile
across regions. An increase in public hiring decrease the labor pool for the local firms, and therefore
crowding-out their employment growth. Taken all together, the evidence we present are consistent
with the crowding out effect of government spending, not through the traditional interest rate or
tax rate channel, but through the labor channel.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Annual Averages of County-level Population Growth Rate
This Figure plots the average county-level population growth rate from 1970 to 2009. The population growth
rate in non-census years are computed using post-censal population estimates published by the Census
Bureau. Post-censal estimates are computed using the previous census count and population changes from
administrative data: birth, death, and migration. The population growth rate in census years 1980, 1990
and 2000 are computed using the current census population count and the post-censal population estimates
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Census-Shock
This Figure plots the distribution of the county-level Census-Shock for the census years 1980, 1990 and
2000. Census − shock is the log difference between the post-censal population estimate and concurrent
census population count. Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count
and population changes from administrative data: birth, death, and migration. Each county-level Census-
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Figure 2.3: Geographical Distribution of Census-Shock
This Figure plots the geographical distribution of the county-level Census-Shock for the census years 1990.
Census-Shock is the log difference between the post-censal population estimate and concurrent census popu-
lation count. Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count and population
changes from administrative data: birth, death and migration. Each county-level Census-Shock represents


























Figure 2.4: Serial Correlation of Census-Shock
This Figure shows the scatter plots of the serial-correlation of the county-level Census-Shock between census
year y and the previous census year y− 10. The fitted line is added to the serial-correlation plot. The slope


















Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This Table provides summary statistics of the main variables used in this study. We keep firms with non-
missing and positive book value of assets. Size is log of the book assets. Q is market assets divide by
book assets. Cashflow is the operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Leverage is
short-term and long-term debt scaled by market value of assets. Capx/At−1 is capital expenditure divide by
book assets. R&D/At−1 is research and development spending divided by book assets. ∆GovSpending is
the log difference in the county-level federal spending. PopGrowthRate is average of county-level population
growth rates across all counties.
Mean Median SD
Capxt/Assett−1 0.0668 0.0424 0.0766
Q 1.7855 1.3324 1.3173
Cashflow 0.0907 0.1177 0.1867
Size 4.1687 4.0906 2.0995
Market Leverage 0.1894 0.1386 0.1866
R&D/Assett−1 0.0687 0.0305 0.0975
Payout/Assett−1 0.0238 0.0037 0.0470
∆ Gov. Spending 0.0275 0.0260 0.0673
Pop growth rate 0.0037 0 0.0139
Observations 133738
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Table 2.2: Census-Shock and Government Spending
This Table presents the first stage regression of the effect of Census-Shock on changes in government spending.
∆GovSpend if the log changes in government spending. Census-shock is the log difference between the
post-censal population estimate and concurrent census population count. Post-censal population estimates
are computed using the previous census count and population changes from administrative data: birth,
death and migration. The sample period is from 1980 to 2006. Control variables include lagged state-
level unemployment growth rate and lagged state-level GDP growth. All models include year-fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗














Table 2.3: Instrumented Government Spending and Corporate Investment
This Table presents results on the effect of county-level government spending on firms’ investment.
∆GovSpend if the change in government spending. ∆GovSpend IV is the instrumented change in gov-
ernment spending obtained from the first stage regression from columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2. The
instrument is Census-Shock, which is the log difference between the post-censal population estimates and
concurrent census population counts. Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous
census count and population changes from administrative data: birth, death and migration. Investment
is investment scaled by book assets, or Capxi,t/At,t−1. Columns (1), (3) and (4) show the OLS regression
of Investment on ∆GovSpend. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the second stage regression of Investment
on the instrumented ∆GovSpend. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. The numbers in
parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆GovSpend IV -0.58∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗
(-10.56) (-2.39) (-9.53) (-2.94)
∆GovSpend 0.10∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01
(8.27) (2.32) (5.29) (0.88)
Q 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(16.35) (16.51) (16.50) (16.56) (18.20) (18.29) (12.89) (12.95)
Cashflow 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(37.72) (37.37) (37.45) (37.43) (37.44) (37.13) (20.10) (20.10)
Leverage -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(-3.24) (-2.45) (-5.32) (-5.20) (-7.59) (-7.13) (-21.99) (-21.84)
Constant 0.03∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(16.75) (20.13) (0.82) (4.68) (5.24) (12.29) (26.06) (9.98)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes No No No No
Industry FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.66 0.66
N 35869 35866 35869 35866 35869 35866 35869 35866
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Table 2.4: Instrumented Government Spending and R&D, Employment Growth, and Sales
Growth.
This Table presents regression results on the effect of county-level government spending on firms’ R&D
investment, employment growth and sales growth. ∆GovSpend IV is the instrumented change in government
spending obtained from the first stage regression in Table 2.2. The instrument is Census-Shock, which is
the log difference between the post-censal population estimates and concurrent census population counts.
Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count and population changes
from administrative data: birth, death and migration. Investment is investment scaled by book assets,
or Capxi,t/At,t−1. R&D is research and development spending divided by book assets, or R&D/At−1.
SalesGrowth the change in the sales scaled by the beginning-of-the-year sales. EmpGrowth is the annual
employment growth measured as the log change in the number of employees. Control variables are firm
characteristics and include Q, Cashflow, and Leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year
level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Investment R&D SalesGrowth EmpGrowth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆GovSpend IV -0.32∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗
(-2.95) (-2.85) (-3.27) (-2.50)
Q 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(16.17) (21.49) (18.29) (10.59)
Cashflow 0.08∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(26.60) (-16.77) (-2.62) (13.05)
Leverage -0.09∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(-27.09) (-8.43) (-12) (-16.64)
Constant 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04
(10.06) (12.72) (2.68) (1.54)
R2 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.04
N 35866 35866 35866 35866
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Table 2.5: Heterogenous Characteristics.
This Table presents results of the effect on state-level government spending on firms’ investment and various
interaction terms. ∆GovSpend IV is the instrumented change in government spending obtained from the
first stage regression in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2. The instrument is Census-Shock, which is the
log difference between the post-censal population estimates and concurrent census population counts. Post-
censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count and population changes from
administrative data: birth, death, and migration. Investment is investment scaled by book assets, or
Capxi,t/At,t−1. Unemployment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the state-level unemployment
rate in the previous 3 years is larger than the median, and 0 otherwise. Size a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the log of book assets is larger than the median, and zero otherwise. GeoDispersion is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the degree of firm’s geographic dispersion, computed as in
Garcia and Norli (2012), is larger than the median, and zero otherwise. LaborIntensity a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the industry-level average labor intensity is larger than the median, and zero
otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆GovSpend IV -0.32∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
(-2.94) (-2.97) (-3.02) (-2.81)
















Q 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(12.80) (15.79) (12.70) (12.74)
Cashflow 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(19.93) (26.33) (20.25) (20.25)
Leverage -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(-21.92) (-27.07) (-21.85) (-21.85)
Constant 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(9.53) (9.89) (10.62) (9.59)
R2 0.66 0.14 0.66 0.66
N 35494 35494 35494 35494
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Table 2.6: Instrumented Government Hiring and Corporate Employment
This Table presents results on the effect of state-level government hiring and wage spending on firm’s
employment growth. The dependent variable is firm-level EmpGrowth, which is the log change in the number
of employees. ∆PubHire is the log change in total number of government employees. ∆PubFTHire is the
change in the state-level full-time public employees. ∆PubPayroll is the log change in the payroll received
by government employees . Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the second stage regression of EmpGrowth on the
three instrumented public hiring variables: ∆PubHire, ∆PubFTHire and ∆PubPayroll. The instrument,
Census-Shock, is defined as the log difference between the post-censal population estimates and concurrent
census population counts. Firm controls include Q, Cashflow, and Leverage. Standard errors are clustered
at the state-year level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: EmpGrowth

















Q 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(10.44) (10.48) (10.44) (10.52) (10.44) (10.51) (10.44) (10.51)
Cashflow 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(12.97) (12.95) (12.97) (12.97) (12.97) (13.02) (12.97) (12.96)
Leverage -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(-16.79) (-16.66) (-16.79) (-16.63) (-16.79) (-16.76) (-16.79) (-16.63)
Constant -0.02∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗
(-3.63) (1.56) (-3.63) (1.06) (-3.63) (0.76) (-3.63) (1.84)
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
N 35869 35866 35868 35866 35868 35866 35868 35866
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CHAPTER 3
DOES AN ACQUIRER’S CEO TIES WITH THE TARGET
AFFECT M&A QUALITY?
3.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity of a firm is a major form of corporate investment, and
hence has direct impact on the return of minority shareholders of both an acquirer and a target.
Corporations have engaged in $3.5 trillion worth of M&A deals worldwide in 2014.
An interesting feature of M&A decisions is that a same deal can have distinct value implications
for different parties; acquirer and target. As target receives premium from an acquirer, overpayment
(excessive premium) implies shareholders of target company gain and shareholders of acquiring
company lose at the same time. Focusing on the fact that a shareholder’ payoff from a deal
depends on the relative stock ownership of acquirer and target shares, we investigate whether the
acquirer manager’s private incentive stemming from his personal stock ownership of a target firm
affects the quality of his M&A decisions that he makes as a manager of an acquirer company.
To answer this question, we focus on the variation in an acquirer manager’s incentive structure
stemming from his employment history. We define a manager of an acquiring company to be
personally connected to a target company if he used to work at a target firm before the M&A deal
is announced. Specifically, an acquiring company is connected to a target if one of the current top
five managers of an acquirer used to work for a target as one of the top five managers before the
merger deal is made public. Making use of this executive-level personal connections between an
acquirer and target, we compare mergers between the connected firms versus mergers without such
connections.
We find that executive-level ties between an acquirer and a target have significantly negative
value implication for an acquirer’s merger announcement returns: -3% for a 7-day window sur-
rounding a deal announcement. The significance of the abnormal announcement returns suggests
that the market participants view these mergers with executive-level ties are not value-enhancing.
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The magnitude of the announcement return also suggests that these merger decisions do have a
substantial effect on the value of the treated firms.
Furthermore, we find that these results are robust when we include the connected managers’
relative stock ownership between a target and an acquirer. That is, the stronger the negative value
effect associated with the executive-level employment connections gets, the higher the connected
manager’s target stock ownership is. Interestingly, we also document that the combined M&A
announcement return is lower for these mergers with executive-level ties compared to other M&A
deals without such ties, which suggests that this type of mergers are in the minority shareholders’
best interest.
The findings in the paper are related to the recent literature which studies how different set of
incentives of M&A decision makers affect the outcome of M&A. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2011) find
that institutional shareholders of an acquirer who hold target stocks are more likely to support
mergers with negative acquirer announcement return, because they hold substantial stakes in the
targets and make up for the losses from the acquirer shares with the gains from the target shares.
Ishii and Xuan (2013) document the negative value impact associated with cross-firm social con-
nection between directors and senior executives at the acquiring and the target firms. Jenter and
Lewellen (2014), using retirement age as a proxy for target CEOs’ private merger costs, show that
target CEO preferences affect merger patterns; the likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid
is sharply higher when target CEOs are close to age 65. Results shown in this literature tend to
confirm that managers’ private preference can distort the incentive alignment between the man-
ager and minority shareholders and directly affect the M&A outcomes. Results suggest that the
personal preference of managers can hurt the payoff of other minority shareholders.
Broadly, this paper is also related to iterature which studies the effect of CEO’s personal prefer-
ences on corporate decision makings (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). For example, Malmendier,
Tate, and Yan show that managerial personal characteristics such as overconfidence, direct expe-
rience of the Great Depression, or military experience affect the manager’s corporate financial
decisions. Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) also document the correlation between CEOs’
corporate and personal leverage choices.
To summarize, we test whether acquirer managers’ private wealth gain associated with his stock
ownership of a target firm affect the quality of their takeover decisions. This paper is the first to
measure a connection between an acquirer and a target based on an acquirer manager’s employment
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history as a way to gauge an acquirer manager’s preference. Results in this paper suggest that
managers’ private benefit can hurt the payoff of minority shareholders. Mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) activity of a firm is a major form of corporate investment and has direct impact on the
return of minority shareholders of both an acquirer and a target. When an acquirer announces
an M&A deal with a target with which an acquirer manager has personal ties, an acquirer firm’s
merger announcement return is worse than other acquirers’ mergers announcment returns without




The mergers and acquisition data are from U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database from the
Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC). We consider mergers between publicly traded U.S. firms. We
exclude share repurchases, privatizations, exchange offers, recapitalizations, and cases in which the
bidder already owns 50% or more of the target’s equity before the merger. Daily stock return data
are from the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Firm financial statement
information is obtained from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat annual database.
To establish an acquirer manager’s personal ties with a target, we analyze the employment
history of an acquirer’s top five executives. To measure executive-level ties, ExecuTies, between an
acquirer and a target, we make use of the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp dataset which contains
detailed information of top five executive officers of each firm. We define the merger pair–acquirer
and target–to be connected when one of the top five executives of an acquirer used to work at a
target as one of the top five executives before the merger happens. When we construct the link, we
use name matching algorithm. That is, we match on the managers’ first and last name as well as
the first initial of the middle name to determine whether the top five officers is the same person. We
also make sure the the same person had worked for a target company before she joins an acquirer
so that she could be a part of the decision maker in the acquisition decisions.
In order to measure the stock ownership that each top executive holds, we use ExecuComp data.
We make use of the amount of target stock ownership that a manager used to have when he was
working at the target company as well as the amount of the acquirer stock ownership while he is
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currently working at the acquiring firm at the time of mergers.
3.2.2 Summary Statistics and Variable Construction
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The ExecuTies Indicator variable takes
a value of one if one of the top five executives of an acquirer firm at the time of the merger
used to work for the target as one of the top executives before the merger between the two firms
happen. Similarly, CEOTies takes a value of one when the current acquirer CEO used to work for
target as one of the top executive before the merger happens. DollarOwnTar-Acq is the connected
executives’ difference of the dollar ownership between an acquirer and a target, which is the sum of
the connected executives’ stock ownership of a target minus the sum of the connected executives’
stock ownership of an acquirer in million dollars. It may not be straightforward to measure an
acquirer manager’s stock ownership of target company shares. We use the amount of target stock
ownership that the connected manager used to have at the time of his employment at the target
company as a proxy for his current amount of target stock ownership at the time of the M&A
announcement. We have 3,422 firm-years with valid M&A announcement return data. In some of
the regressions which requires additional financial statement data and M&A deal characteristics,
we have 2,144 observations.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we describe the experimental design. We exploit the employment history of an
acquirer manager who worked for a target to evaluate the effect of the private benefit of managers
on M&A consequences of a firm. Specifically, we define an acquirer to be connected to a target if
the acquirer manager had worked as one of the top five executives before she joins the acquirer as
one of the top five executives.
Then, we use difference-in-difference regression in order to examine whether the merger decisions
made by managers who are connected to a target from their employment history are different
from other mergers without such executive-level connections. For the comparison, we use merger
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announcement return as an outcome variable. Specifically, we run the following regression:
Announcement Returni,t,d = α+ βI{ExecuTies}i,t + ηFirm Controlsi,t−1
+κDeal Controlsj,t + Indk + νt + i,t,d (3.1)
Similarly, to estimate the effect of relative target stock ownership of an acquiring firm manger on
acquirer’s merger announcement returns, we also estimate the following regression:
Announcement Returni,t,d = α+ βI{ExecuTies}i,t + γDollarOwnTar-Acqi,t−1
+ηFirm Controlsi,t−1 + κDeal Controlsj,t + Indk + νt + i,t,d
(3.2)
where i indexes companies, j indexes M&A deals, k indexes industries, t indexes years, d indexes
days; Announcement Return is the dependent variable of interest, ExecuTies is an indicator variable
(“treatment indicator”) that equals one if an acquirer manager in year t used work for a target
mangers in the past; Firm Controls is the vector of firm-level control variables, which includes
cashflow, book leverage, and firm size. We also include two-digit level SIC code industry fixed-
effects and year fixed-effects. The coefficient of interest is β which measures the effect of the acquirer
manager’s private benefit stemming from an acquirer manager having target stock ownership.
3.4 Main Results
Table 3.2 shows the benchmark result where we compare the announcement returns of mergers
with executive-level ties versus mergers without such ties. We find that acquirers’ announcement
returns associated with a merger where an acquirer manager holds target stock are significantly
lower compared to other mergers. The magnitude is also significant. Acquirer’s announcement
return is -3% lower than other mergers without managerial ties for a 7-day window surrounding a
merger announcement.
Table 3.3 shows that the higher the connected managers’ target stock ownership the worse the
acquirer’s merger announcement returns are. Furthermore, as Table 3.4 documents, we find that
these results are robust when we include firm-level and deal-level control variable. In fact, the
coefficient on the variable interaction term DollarOwnTar-Acq becomes bigger as well as statistically
more significant when we include firm and deal-level control variables.
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This finding is consistent with the agency story in which an acquirer manager with target stock
ownership engages in a worse acquisition expecting his private wealth gain from his target stock
ownership. Since it is likely that target stock price would go up when merger deal is announced,
as a target receives premium from an acquirer.1 Although an M&A deal is not optimal for an
acquirer and acquirer merger announcement return is not viewed favorable in the market, the
acquirer manager with target stock ownership may still gain positive payoff due to his target stock
ownership.
Another alternative hypothesis consistent with our finding is that a manager of an acquirer
company might want to cater to his former colleagues in a target company in terms of premium
payment. An acquirer managers’ may have private catering preference for the target managers
whom the acquirer manager used to work together with. By overpaying the premium, an acquirer
manager can essentially pay himself as well as his friends.
Interestingly, however, we find that the combined M&A announcement return is lower for these
mergers with executive-level ties. The results are shown in Table 3.5. This result implies that the
connected managers may not be able to gain wealth by engaging in these mergers with executives’
personal ties assuming their relative stock ownership between an acquirer and a target are propor-
tional to their market cap. The combined return results also suggest that this type of mergers are
not socially optimal not in the shareholders’ best interest.
An alternative hypothesis consistent with the finding is that connected managers are biased and
overconfident about the value of the target. Acquirer managers with prior employment history in
the target may be more familiar with the target as he worked for the target in the past, and the
familiarity can be a source of his overconfidence in his target valuation. Or, bias can stem from
the personal attachment that the manager has with his former colleagues who are still working at
the target company.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of acquirer manager’s private benefit on M&A performance.
When a manager of an acquiring firm has private preference stemming from his target stock own-
ership, this private incentive affect his mergers decisions that he makes on behalf of an acquirer.
1Many papers in the literature confirm this observation. For example, see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990);
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001); Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz (2005).
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When a top manager of an acquirer used to work for a target, the announcement return of an M&A
deal tend to be lower than other mergers without such connections.
As target stock price is expected to appreciate when a merger deal happens, an acquirer manager
can still gain overall from a merger decision if he can compensate his potential loss (or lukewarm
announcement return reaction of an acquiring firm) from acquirer stock ownership with target stock
price run-up. Consistent with the main result, the negative value impact of acquirer manager’s
connection with a target is stronger when the connected manager holds relatively bigger shares of
a target company. Our findings establish that managerial private benefit has a significant impact
on firms’ takeover decisions and on shareholder value.
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) Ishii and Xuan (2014) Bertrand and Schoar (2003) Andrade, Mitchell,
and Stafford (2001) Jenter and Lewellen (Forthcoming) Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1990)
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3.6 Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
The table shows that the descriptive statistics of the sample. ExecuTies takes a value of one when one of the current
top five executive of an acquirer used to work for target as one of the top executive before the merger happens.
CEOTies takes a value of one when the current acquirer CEO used to work for target as one of the top executive
before the merger happens. DollarOwnTar-Acq is the connected executives’ relative dollar ownership between an
acquirer and a target, which is the sum of the connected executives’ stock ownership of a target minus the sum
of the connected executives’ stock ownership of an acquirer in million dollars. Q is market value of asset (mva)
scaled by assets, where mva is computed using Compustat items as prccq×cshoq+atq-ceqq-txditcq. Cashflow is
operating income before depreciation (Compustat item oibdp) scaled by total assets. Book Leverage is long-term
and short-term debt (Compustat item dltt+dlc) scaled by total assets.
Mean Std. Dev. Count
ExecuTies .0303 .1714 4192
CEOTies .0012 .0345 4192
DollarOwnTar-Acq .0119 .1257 133
Log Acq. Mkt Cap 14.5111 2.2493 4098
Log Tar. Mkt Cap 12.2694 1.8720 3937
Booklev Acq .2284 .2084 4100
Booklev Tar .2248 .2417 3987
Q Acq 2.3983 3.2405 3101
Q Tar 2.3003 3.7237 3127
Cashflow Acq .0803 .5939 3875
Cashflow Tar -.0933 1.2925 3723
85
Table 3.2: Acquirer M&A Announcement Returns
This table shows that acquirer announcement return is lower when an acquirer manager is expected to have private
stock ownership of a target. The outcome variable is the merger announcement return of an acquirer. The variable
of interest is ExecuTies, which measures the executive-level connection between an acquirer and a target through
acquirer manager’s employment history. The first panel shows the results when the dependent variable is the raw
stock returns, and the second panel shows the results when the dependent variable is the market-adjusted abnormal
stock returns. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Announcement Returni,t,d = α+ βI{ExecuTies}i,t + νt + i,t,d
Panel A: Raw Returns
Acq raw(-3,3) Acq raw(-5,5) Acq raw(-10,10)
ExecuTies -0.0314∗∗ -0.0339∗∗ -0.0477∗∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0109) (0.0142)
Constant -0.0059∗∗∗ -0.0005 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0025)
Observations 3422 3419 3416
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.002 0.003
Panel B: Market-adjusted Returns
Acq Ab(-3,3) Acq Ab(-5,5) Acq Ab(-10,10)
ExecuTies -0.0250∗∗ -0.0248∗ -0.0386∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0103) (0.0133)
Constant -0.0092∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗ -0.0001
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0023)
Observations 3422 3419 3416
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.001 0.002
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Table 3.3: Acquirer M&A Announcement Returns with Manager’s Ownership
of Target Shares
This table shows that the negative value impact associated with an acquirer manager’s private stock ownership of
target shares gets stronger when the connected acquirer managers’ target stock ownership increases. The outcome
variable is the merger announcement return of an acquirer company. The variable of interest is ExecuTies, which
measures the executive-level connection between an acquirer and a target through acquirer manager’s employment
history. DollarOwnTar-Acq is the connected executives’ difference of the dollar ownership between an acquirer and
a target, which is the sum of the connected executives’ stock ownership of a target minus the sum of the connected
executives’ stock ownership of an acquirer in million dollars. Firm Controls are measured at the annual frequencies
and one-year lagged values are used in the regression. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
Announcement Returni,t,d = α+ βI{ExecuTies}i,t + γDollarOwnTar-Acqi,t−1 + Indj + νt + i,t,d







Year FE Yes Yes
Ind FE Yes Yes
Observations 3344 3344
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.018
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Table 3.4: Robustness Check: Acquirer M&A Announcement Returns with
Manager’s Ownership of Target Shares
This table confirms the earlier result that the negative value impact associated with an acquirer manager’s private
stock ownership of target shares gets stronger when the connected acquirer managers’ target stock ownership increases,
even after controlling for firm and deal-level controls. The outcome variable is the merger announcement return of
an acquirer company. The variable of interest is ExecuTies, which measures the executive-level connection between
an acquirer and a target through acquirer manager’s employment history. DollarOwnTar-Acq is the connected
executives’ difference of the dollar ownership between an acquirer and a target, which is the sum of the connected
executives’ stock ownership of a target minus the sum of the connected executives’ stock ownership of an acquirer
in million dollars. Firm Controls are measured at the annual frequencies and one-year lagged values are used in the
regression. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of
statistical significance, respectively.
Announcement Returni,t,d = α+ βI{ExecuTies}i,t + γDollarOwnTar-Acqi,t−1
+ηFirm Controlsi,t−1 + κDeal Controlsi,t + Indj + νt + i,t,d





Q Acq -0.003∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Q Tar -0.001 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)




Year FE Yes Yes
Ind FE Yes Yes
Observations 2144 2144
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.019
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Table 3.5: Acqurier-Target Combined Returns associated with Merger An-
nouncement
This table shows the mergers associated with executive-level ties tend to destroy value when we consider the com-
bined announcement returns. The outcome variable is the value-weighted combined return of an acquirer and target
company. The variable of interest is ExecuTies, which measures the executive-level connection between an acquirer
and a target through acquirer manager’s employment history. DollarOwnTar-Acq is the connected executives’ differ-
ence of the dollar ownership between an acquirer and a target, which is the sum of the connected executives’ stock
ownership of a target minus the sum of the connected executives’ stock ownership of an acquirer in million dollars.
Firm Controls are measured at the annual frequencies and one-year lagged values are used in the regression. Industry
is defined at the two-digit SIC level. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance,
respectively.
Announcement Returni,t,d = α+ βI{ExecuTies}i,t + γDollarOwnTar-Acqi,t−1








Year FE Yes Yes
Ind FE Yes Yes
Observations 3394 3405
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.001
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